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“A government should not be called upon to defend its regulation of advertising in a 
court of human rights...”1
“At bottom, the Enron and WorldCom cases are about false advertising.”2
“[T]here is no use trying to find villains, because the problem is in the structure of the 
situation.”3
If you open a newspaper in the United States these days it is difficult to escape the 
fallout from the last decade of corporate excesses.  WorldCom. Enron.  Arthur Andersen. 
Tyco. American International Group.4  Citibank agreed to pay a $2 billion dollar 
settlement in relation to its role in the Enron fiasco.5  As large as that amount seems, it 
may have gotten away with a bargain since, according to some observers, Citibank’s 
exposure could have been even greater than $2 billion.6  Other firms, Chase, Merrill 
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1 ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION (Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 
2003) at 3 (emphasis in original).
2Edward J. Janger, Brandeis, Business Ethics, and Enron at 69 in NANCY B. RAPOPORT AND BALA G. 
DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Foundation Press, New York, N.Y., 
2004).
3 THOM HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION; THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND THE THEFT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS at 22 (Rodale, 2002).
4
 The Saturday, June 4, 2005 issue of The New York Times carried at least 5 stories related to corporate 
misfeasance.  Julie Creswell, Citigroup Agrees to Pay 2 $ Billion in Enron Scandal, page 1, B13, Jurors in 
Trial of Two Tyco Executives End the Week Without Completing a Verdict, Business Briefs, B2; A Second 
Guilty Plea in A.I.G.-Related Case, B13; Eric Dash, Former Wal-Mart Executive Stripped of Benefits, B13; 
Ken Belson, Ebbers Pleads for Leniency in Sentencing, B13.
5 Id.
6 Id. “‘The potential exposure to the banks in this case could have been really large,’” said Joseph A. 
Grundfest, a law professor at Stanford University and a former commissioner at the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. ‘It was not in the best interest of Citigroup to push the issue through to a jury 
verdict.’” Id.
2Lynch have yet to settle (or will probably have settled by the time this goes to press).7
Ebbers, Kozlowski, Rigas and Quattrone have been convicted, and the trials of top Enron 
executives, Ken Lay, Jeffrey Skilling and Richard Causey are still ahead.8  Furthermore, 
largely in response to spectacular failures like Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) law was 
passed in 20029 as an attempt to tighten up corporate responsibility and accountability.
Yet, for many reasons, real accountability has been elusive.  First, the legal 
structure of a corporation most often shields the flesh and blood actors in the corporation 
– shareholders, officers and directors, executives – from personal liability.10  And, in 
those circumstances where an exception would apply and liability could theoretically 
attach, corporate officers, directors and managers act within a collectivity11 that diffuses 
both knowledge and responsibility such that no one person may really possess the sort of 
guilty knowledge that serves in many minds as a prerequisite for liability.12  Undoubtedly 
many of those few who did find themselves convicted could say, along with former 
WorldCom, Inc accountant, Betty Vinson, “I never expected to be here.”13  Thus, 
ultimately, it has been difficult to satisfactorily hold anyone to account in way that offers 
any comfort that the future will be fundamentally different from the past.14  Citibank’s $2 
7
 On June 15, 2005 J.P. Morgan announced its agreement to settle and pay investors $2.2 billion for 
damages arising out of the Enron failure.
8 Id. at B13.
9 SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
10 See BAUMAN, WEISS & PALMITER, CORPORATIONS LAW & POLICY, 5th ed. West Publishing 2003 at 1 
describing limited liability as one of the distinctive features of the corporate form.  Of course under 
exceptional circumstances officers, directors and/or shareholders can be held liable for the debts or 
obligations of the firm where there are grounds for piercing the corporate veil.  It is also difficult to hold a 
firm liable for anything where intent or state of mind is relevant. See, e.g., Stacey Neumann Vu, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: Patchwork Verdicts and the Problem of Locating a Guilty Agent, 104 COL. L. REV.
459 (2004) (describing difficulties assigning mens rea where responsibility is diffused).
11
 For a description of the collective nature of the firm see Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why 
Corporate Speech is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1021-34.
12 See Arthur Andersen v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129 (2005) (conviction overturned because jury 
instruction failed to adequately convey to jury the requirement of intent).
13
 Erin McClam (Associated Press), WorldCom figures sentenced, TULSA WORLD, Saturday, Aug. 6, 2005, 
E6 (quoting Betty Vinson at her sentencing).  While it may be unclear on its face whether she meant she 
was sorry and surprised because she hadn’t started out to do wrong, or she just meant that she hadn’t expect 
to get caught, her subsequent comment that she would never “do anything like this again” seems to put the 
slant in the direction of the first interpretation.  But even if she just didn’t expect to get caught, it may be 
fair to say that most corporate crimes have an even better chance of succeeding and leading to no penalties 
than for their perpetrators than crime in general.
14
 For example the Supreme Court of the United States just reversed the criminal conviction of the Arthur 
Andersen accounting firm on the grounds that “the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey the 
requisite consciousness of wrongdoing.” Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 2136 
(2005).  The metaphysics of locating a corporation’s consciousness is not too far removed from that of 
asking where it is located.  Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).  Nevertheless, even if we take a functional approach and say that the 
individual employees stand in for the corporation, the disaggregation of tasks into many smaller bits, the 
dispersal of authority for discrete tasks among many actors, the credo of profit maximization for 
shareholders – these facts and perhaps others seemingly make it more difficult to locate the requisite state 
of mind in any one employee and hence to attribute the same to the corporation.  See also, WILLIAM A. 
3billion dollar settlement isn’t nothing, but it isn’t certain just how large the settlement 
would have to be to discourage future officers and directors from ever engaging in similar 
conduct.15  Put another way, it isn’t possible to know whether Citigroup has been 
“punished” without knowing how much money it made on these transactions with Enron.  
If it made a $20 billion profit for example, a $2 billion reduction in that profit still leaves 
a healthy $18 billion profit.  That number, and the question of whether any profit at all is 
left after all the associated costs of the Enron collapse are factored in, is pure speculation.  
And while we cannot assume that the specter of criminal sanctions or public relations 
scandals have no effect on deterring undesirable, it still seems that the primary motivating 
factor in decision-making is whether the action will be profitable.
Nevertheless, the question illustrates one of the principal difficulties with 
regulating corporate conduct – including speech:  “For a corporation, compliance with 
law, like everything else, is a matter of costs and benefits.”16  If the benefits outweigh the 
costs Citigroup presumably will do again what it did with Enron.  In fact, according to 
some, it may have a duty to shareholders to do so.17  And the evidence suggests that 
while the past 10 years have included more spectacular corporate misconduct, the 
existence of corporate law breaking in pursuit of profit is not only not anomalous, it is 
endemic.18  The catalog of ways in which corporate misconduct has contributed to social 
ills, such as environmental pollution, harmful products, lost pensions, and so forth, seems 
sufficiently manifest as to cut off the question of whether there is a problem.  The 
question rather is what to do about it.
KLEIN AND JOHN C. COFFEE, JR, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, (9th ed. 2002) (Foundation 
Press) at 117-122 (critiquing the reification illusion).
15 See JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER
(Penguin Canada, Ontario Canada, 2004) (describing the profit motive as the single unifying aim of 
corporate behavior).
16 Id. at 79.
17
 In a contractarian view of the theory of corporations, firms are run for the benefit of shareholders.  See, 
e.g., BAUMAN, WEISS & PALMITER, supra note 10 at 465.  That theory could (but does not) require 
officers and directors to do everything possible to maximize the value of those stockholders’ shares.  
However, the business judgment rule acts as a check on judicial imposition of a strict sort of profit only 
interpretation of management’s duties.  And judicial interpretation of the business judgment rule had been 
fairly deferential to management decision-making.  For a lengthy discussion of why corporate law does not, 
in fact, and ought not create a duty to maximize shareholder value to the exclusion of some, limited profit 
sacrificing behavior see Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y. U. L. 
REV. 733 (2005).  For discussions of the shareholder primacy theory that equate it with a duty to profit 
maximize as well as the argument that this position accords with the best social outcomes see Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of Corporate History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 
(2001).  For a discussion comparing the development of differing norms as between U.S. and Europe with 
respect to this issue see Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial 
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063 (2001). Of course one could say that there is never a fiduciary duty 
to break the law.  But the problem with this statement is that it is often unclear that the law has been broken 
until after the fact.
18
 For example see the four-page list of violations committed by General Electric between 1990 and 2001. 
in Professor Bakan’s study of the corporation.  Id. at 75-78.  Most of the listed instances involve civil not 
criminal allegations.  Nevertheless, they all appear to involve issues that are regulated by the government 
and suggest disregard for that regulation. 
4While many observers focus on ethical issues, recalibrating executive 
compensation, or the possibility of changes to corporate structure and to accounting rules 
for the prevention of future “Enrons,”19 far too little attention has been paid to a key 
factor making Enron possible – the nature of corporate communication.  Enron’s 
management systematically failed to communicate important facts that investors, 
employees and the public might want to know, while simultaneously flooding the market 
with ersatz “information” designed to package, promote and “sell” the public on its own 
version of the corporation’s worth.20  It could do this because of a legal environment in 
which duties to disclose are sometimes ambiguous and may be laxly enforced (even in 
the absence of an intent to deceive), while there is a virtually unbridled freedom for 
corporate speech that takes the form of marketing and public relations.  
In other words communication, or the lack thereof, is a key factor in both the 
development of Enron-like disasters and in their prevention.  New York Times media 
columnist Frank Rich claims that it was public relations propaganda that propped up 
Enron’s “house of cards.”21  It is difficult to understand how else to explain how the 
company managed to succeed in selling itself to investors, the financial media and the 
public at large when there was so little in the way of hard factual support for its claims of 
profits.22  But it seems that facts and empirical support were not very significant to 
investors or the media.  And there is little evidence of a change in the media climate.  
Instead, “spin,” how it plays, the spectacle, 23 is all-important in influencing behavior of 
19 RAPOPORT & DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS, supra note 2 (collected essays dissecting what 
happened and some proposed remedies).
20 Id. Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How Enron’s Public Image 
Morphed from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most Notorious Company Ever, in 
RAPOPORT & DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS (describing public relations success) and Frank 
Rich, Enron: Patron Saint of Bush’s Fake News, THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 20, 2005. (detailing some 
of the P.R. exercises that created the image that Rapoport and Van Niel describe).
21 Id.  One example of such P.R. efforts was a tour Enron executives gave financial analysts of Enron’s 
newly launched EES division in 1998.  The analysts were taken to the 6th floor in Enron’s headquarters.
There, they beheld the very picture of a sophisticated, booming business: a big open 
room, bustling with people, all busily working the telephones and hunched over computer 
terminals, seemingly cutting deals and trading energy. Giant plasma screens displayed electronic 
maps, which could show the sites of EES’s many contracts and prospects. Commodity priced 
danced across an electronic ticker. “IT was very impressive, “recalls analyst John Olson, who at 
the time, covered the company for Merrill Lynch.  “It was a veritable beehive of activity.”
It was also a veritable sham. The war room had been rapidly fitted out explicitly to 
impress the analysts.
BETHANY MCLEAN AND PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM, (Portfolio, Penguin 
Group, 2003) at 179-80.
22
 Enron’s continuing to post profits despite being unable to show how it generated them, and in spite of a 
refusal to offer balance sheets and cash flow statements led some observers to refer to it as a “black box.” 
MCLEAN AND ELKIND, supra note 21at 320-321.
23
 How else to explain the apparent widespread apathy or collective shrug of the shoulders at the gradual 
revelation that Iraq apparently had no weapons of mass destruction?
5all kinds – consumer, political,24 personal – and all of these behaviors are heavily 
influenced by massive “speech” efforts on the part of corporate speakers.25
According to Judge Richard Posner, news itself is a commodity like everything 
else. “Being profit-driven, the media respond to actual demands of their audience rather 
that to the idealized ‘thirst’ for knowledge’ demand posited by public intellectuals and 
deans of journalism schools.”26  However, he theorizes that fortunately for those who are
interested in the truth there is nevertheless, “a market demand for correcting the errors 
and ferreting out the misdeeds of one’s enemies...”27  Alas, for Enron’s stockholders, 
creditors and other investors, these motives apparently didn’t arise soon enough.28  Nor 
are they likely to in the future with respect to any future “Enrons.”  This is because very 
often there is no “enemy” for a company in which everything seems to be going well, at 
least judging by stock prices.29  In addition, the news media have become so dependent 
upon the corporations themselves for the information about companies that too often their 
reporters rely exclusively on information from the companies themselves, rather than on 
independent newsgathering.  Such information is supplied largely in the form of press 
releases, web postings, press conferences, and other public relations tools.  And most of 
the content of that is unregulated.
Since the 1970s governmental regulation of advertising in the United States has 
come under increasing scrutiny as a burden on “speech” or freedom of expression.30
While it is difficult to identify the cause, during that same period corporations have 
pressed for and increasingly obtained, greater roles in politics in the form of contribution 
to candidates or causes,31 the formation of political action committees or other groups to 
24
 One of the most offensive examples of this is President Bush’s Chief of Staff Andrew Card explaining 
the timing of the Iraq war invasion with, “You don’t introduce new products in August.” George Packer, 
Comment: Name Calling, in Talk of the Town, THE NEW YORKER, August 8 & 15, 2005 at 33.
25
 By “corporations” I mean principally large, publicly traded corporations.  If of sufficient size, even the 
close corporation could have widespread impact on the tenor and type of speech in the market.  The key 
components of the problem I deal with here are the aggregations of large amounts of capital combined with 
a commercial purpose.
26
 Richard A. Posner, Bad News, THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW, July 31, 2005 at 9.
27 Id. at 9-10.
28
 They did arise eventually.  The Enron story apparently was broken by an inquisitive Fortune reporter, 
Bethany McLean. See MCLEAN AND ELKIN, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM, supra, note 21.
29
 Many investors and analysts were unwilling to talk to McLean on the record. See MCLEAN AND ELKIN, 
supra note 21 at 321.
30 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 758-60 (1976) 
(discussing the historical movement of the Court’s decisions to greater protection for commercial speech).  
See also SHINER, supra note 1 at 25-69 (discussing history of freedom for commercial expression in the 
United States); Alan B. Morrison, How We Got the Commercial Speech Doctrine: An Originalist’s 
Recollections, 54 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1189 (2004) (discussing doctrinal setting in which 
Virginia Pharmacy case took place and strategic considerations from one of the lawyers for one of the 
plaintiffs in the case).
31
 First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)(extending First Amendment rights to corporations’ 
expenditures for advertising that related to political lobbying).  But see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (retreating from Bellotti to the extent that Bellotti suggested no distinction 
between human and corporate speakers; maintaining that corporations were creatures of the state and 
enjoyed certain advantages pursuant to law that human beings did not, advantages that may at times justify 
corresponding restrictions not applicable to people).
6lobby on their behalf,32 and proposing legislation designed to address their interests.33  A 
key component on which this trend has been built is the identification of the corporation 
as a “person”34 – a person with rights to freedom of expression.35
This trend, to push for corporate rights paralleling those of human beings, is not 
one limited to the United States.  The same trend can be observed in Canada and 
Europe.36  Thus, corporations have, among other tactics, claimed that some restrictions on 
advertising are violations of the right of freedom of expression set forth in Article 10 of 
32 See, e.g., JOHN C. STAUBER AND SHELDON RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE IS GOOD FOR YOU!, (Common 
Courage Press, Monroe, MA, U.S.A., 1995) (describing influence of public relations lobbying, primarily, 
but not exclusively, on behalf of business interests).  For a similar thesis which has a Canadian focus and 
which was conducted a almost a decade earlier see JOYCE NELSON, SULTANS OF SLEAZE: PUBLIC 
RELATIONS AND MEDIA, (Between the Lines, Toronto, Canada 1989).
33
 For example the recent bankruptcy reforms in the United States making it more difficult for individuals 
to declare bankruptcy was largely drawn up and promoted by the credit card industry to make it more 
difficult to discharge credit card debt. See, e.g., Michael Schroeder & Suein Hwang, Revised Chapters: 
Sweeping New Bankruptcy Law to Make Life Harder for Debtors; After 8 Years, Legislation Finally Nears 
Passage; No Limits on Card Giants; A Day Trader's Bills Come Due, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2005, at A1. 
“On April 20, President Bush signed what has been termed the biggest rewrite of U.S. bankruptcy law in a 
quarter century. The bill, titled the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(the "Bill"), takes direct aim at the ability of consumers to discharge their debts through Chapter 7 
Liquidation and Chapter 13 Reorganization by making the process more difficult and more expensive for 
consumers.” Michael J. Davis, The New Bankruptcy Code: Goodbye Consumer Chapter 7 Cases, 17 
DCBA BRIEF 16 (June 2005).
34
 Initially corporations were thought to have only those rights that were explicitly granted to them. See 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 4 L.Ed. 629, 636-37 (1819).  
However, in the late nineteenth century the Court began shifting to the view that corporations were 
“persons” for purposes of the analysis of some rights.  This shift is commonly attributed to the Court’s 
decision in Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). “Thus, the Court 
converted an amendment primarily designed to protect the rights of blacks into an amendment whose major 
effect, for the next seventy years, was to protect the rights of corporations.” Mark Tushnet, Corporations 
and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, DAVID KAIRYS, Ed., (Pantheon, New York 1982) at 256.  For 
an excellent discussion of the history of the development of corporate theory as well as an argument that 
what Justice Field meant by corporate personhood in 1886 is significantly different from the natural entity 
theory that later developed see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 
1870-1960 at 65-107 (Chapt. 3, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory). See also 
KLEIN AND COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, supra note 14 at 112-117 (discussing 
development of current doctrine); TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA, (Berrett-Koehler Publishers, San 
Francisco, CA, 2003) (describing rise of corporate power).
35 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575) (Nike arguing 
that a lawsuit by a California activist charging that Nike had issued false statements in its press releases 
infringed on its first amendment rights); Brief of Exxonmobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley and 
Glaxosmithkline as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 2003 WL 835523 at *2 
(“Nike’s speech and speech by corporations on other matter of public concern merit the highest level of 
First Amendment protection.”). One might expect such positions from commercial entities.  More 
surprising were the statements of support from organizations like the ACLU and the Thomas Jefferson 
Center for the Protection of Freedom of Expression.  Both entities filed briefs in support of the notion that 
freedom for corporate speech was an essential component of freedom of speech for all.  See 2003 WL 
1192678, Amici Curiae Brief of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the protection of Free Expression and the 
Media Institute (Feb. 28, 2005) and 2003 WL 721563, Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the ACLU of Northern California in Support of Petitioner (Feb. 24, 2003).
36 See SHINER, supra note 1 at 70-93 & 94-110 (describing similar moves to greater protections for 
commercial expression in Canada and Europe respectively).
7the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.37  Given 
that some European countries have regulations which are significantly more restrictive of 
advertising than U.S. law,38 it is clear that the adoption of a theory that corporations have 
speech rights completely analogous to those of persons will pose a threat to the continued 
viability of those regulatory efforts, particularly as the notion that human rights require 
explicit and vigorous protection gains ground.  But “human rights” may represent a 
Trojan horse through which corporations obtain a legal argument that acts as a shield 
against all manner of governmental regulation.
Less well examined (although not by any means unexamined)39 is the question: 
Why should corporations have “human rights”?  Arguably they should not.  But once the 
corporation was identified as a person for some purposes, the parallels apparently became 
irresistible to some and the rational basis for distinguishing between natural and fictitious 
persons (it appears) harder to summon up.  This trend is one with enormous rhetorical 
power.  By claiming expressive rights, corporations tap into cherished notions of 
autonomy, freedom and fairness.40  And it is a fraud.  As Professor Shiner of the 
University of Alberta puts it:
37 See, e.g., Notice for the OJ 11, Sept. 2003 by Kreuzer Medien GmbH against the European Parliament 
and the Council for the European Union challenging the regulation of tobacco products as “infring[ing]” on 
“the freedom of expression safeguarded by Article 11 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the european 
union and Article 1091) of the ECHR.”  So far, to this author’s knowledge, such attempts to limit the 
regulation of products causing health risks have been rebuffed, see, e.g., Decision of the Court of 
Arbitration of Belgium, 102/99, 30 September 1999 (banning advertising for tobacco products not at 
variance with freedom of expression), Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly, 15 June 2000, Case C-
376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and Council of Europe and Case C-74/99 The 
Queen V. Secretary of State for Health and Other, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd. and others, “I  conclude, 
therefore, that the Advertising Directive does not constitute a disproportionate restriction of freedom of 
expression in so far as it imposes a comprehensive prohibition on the advertising of tobacco products.” 
¶175.  Although I recognize that the effect of these decisions and their applicability is ambiguous, see 
Benjamin Apt, On the Right to Freedom of Expression in the European Union, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 69, 
86-87 (1998) (“The legal status of the Convention in the EU has [ ] been perpetually ambiguous.”), such 
decisions are instructive because they shape perceptions. 
38
 For example, Sweden prohibits ads targeting children under the age of 12.  LORD CAMPBELL OF 
ALLOWAY, Q.C. & ZAHD YAQUB, THE EUROPEAN HANDBOOK ON ADVERTISING LAW (Cavendish 
Publishing, Ltd., London, U.K., 1999) at 789 (Ch. 6, s 1 of the Radio and Television Act, 1996)(Radio-och 
TV-lagen 1996:844)(“advertising must not be targeted at children below the age of 12...”).  And British 
regulators recently “introduced new rules barring depictions of links between sex and drinking in alcohol 
advertisements.”  Eric Pfanner, No Hunks in the Alcohol Advertisements, Please, We’re British, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES C4, (Aug. 1, 2005).
39
 Many of the arguments and objections I advance here, or some version thereof, have been forcefully set 
out by others, most notably by professors Daniel Greenwood, Roger Shiner, Joel Bakan, and C. Edwin 
Baker. See Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note 11; SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL 
EXPRESSION, supra note 1; BAKAN, THE CORPORATION, supra note 15; C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, 
Politics, and Citizen Freedom: the Commercial Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE WES. RES. L. REV.
1161 (2204); C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS, (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, N.J. 1994). 
40
 Although it is worthwhile to take extravagant statements about the deep commitment to freedom of 
speech with a grain of salt given that there is very little of such freedom in the workplace, that is, if one 
wants to keep his job.  And work is where a number of citizens spend most of their waking hours. An 
analysis of the way in which employers are able to punish speech with which they disagree suggests that as 
a society, or at least in law, deference to property mostly trumps deference to freedom of speech.  See, e.g., 
8Behind the respect traditionally given in liberal democratic thought to freedom of 
expression as an ideal lies an attractive picture of human beings as autonomous 
choosers, and of human flourishing as relying on freely chosen sociality.  The 
corporate domination of both the real market and the market-place of ideas 
defaces this attractive picture.  The predatory attempt by corporations to 
appropriate the picture in order to justify constitutional protection for the 
contribution made by corporate expression to that domination needs to be exposed 
as the conceptual and normative fraud that it is.41
Alas, there are few signs that the trend to treat corporations as “persons” with 
expressive rights is slowing.  If anything, it appears to have gained ground.  In the U.S. 
the recent Nike case resulted in an opinion that, while not ruling in Nike’s favor because 
of jurisdictional issues, nevertheless suggested that a majority of the Supreme Court 
seemed to think that fairness and equal time for all viewpoints required that Nike’s 
“viewpoint” be given constitutional protection, lest its communication be unduly 
“chilled.”42  Completed elided by this argument is the fact that Nike’s views are largely 
organized around the corporate necessity of profit, a single-mindedness of purpose that 
Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L. J. 101 (1995); Richard 
Michael Fischl, Labor, Management, and the First Amendment: Whose Rights Are These, Anyway?, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 729 (1989).  Moreover, there is some evidence that the whistleblower protection 
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley have proven particularly effective.  
Three years ago, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law and hailed as a safety net for 
employees who stepped forward and revealed wrongdoing at their companies.  But of the 
hundreds of people who lost jobs and filed complaints since the act was passed, only two are 
actually back at their jobs. 
Jayne O’Donnell, Blowing the whistle can lead to harsh aftermath, despite law, USA TODAY, August 1, 
2005 at 1B.
41 SHINER, supra note 1at 3.
42
 The Stevens opinion concurring in the dismissal, which was joined by Ginsburg and Souter in the 
relevant part, reflects a concern for the potential “chilling effect” if Kasky’s lawsuit was able to proceed, a 
concern that presumes that corporations offer valuable input in this context and that overlooks the 
significance of the demurrer.  See Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 123 S.Ct. 2554, 2558-59 (Stevens, J. 
concurring).  Kennedy dissented without opinion, but in an earlier opinion he suggested, and was joined in 
this opinion by Justice Scalia, that, in his view, the Central Hudson test was insufficiently protective of 
“truthful, nonmisleading speech.”  He didn’t say how it was insufficiently protected, but it is a statement 
suggesting more rather than less protection for commercial speech.  See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 
533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001)(Kennedy, J concurring).  Justice Breyer wrote a dissent from the decision to 
dismiss, thus indicating he would have preferred to decide the Nike case.  And his opinion, joined by 
Justice O’Connor, left little doubt about what he thought of Nike’s argument.  He appeared to agree that 
allowing Kasky’s lawsuit to proceed would generate a “chilling effect” on future speech. Nike, Inc. v. 
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 123 S.Ct. 2554, 2568 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas has straightforwardly 
announced his support for treating advertising speech like political speech in earlier opinions. See, e.g.,
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)(“I would subject all of 
the advertising restrictions to strict scrutiny and would hold that they violate the First Amendment.”).  By 
my count, this suggests that a majority of the Court is receptive, at least in part, to arguments such as Nike 
advanced.  Note that even if the members of the Court agreed in principle that false speech was not 
protected by the First Amendment, the procedural structure would virtually guarantee no meaningful 
restriction on false speech.  For different analysis of this case see David C. Vladeck, Lessons From A Story 
Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE WES.RES. L. REV. 1049 (2004).
9(perhaps thankfully) natural persons rarely possess.43  And its resources are such that only 
the willfully blind could claim that Nike had not had an opportunity to air its views.44
According to Kasky, the plaintiff in that case, the problem was that Nike had aired its 
“views” far too widely and thereby intentionally misled consumers, investors and the 
general public as to its labor and manufacturing practices.  
What was at issue in the Nike case was whether Nike could be held liable if its 
statements concerning its labor practices were false.  What it wanted was the ability to 
say whatever it deemed in its best interest without any liability should some of its 
statements later be deemed false, even if the false statements were made knowing that 
they were false, with the erection of a constitutional shield from costs, imposed by fines, 
judgments and the other impedimenta of governmental regulation associated with untrue 
claims.45  But a key issue in the Enron and WorldCom fiascos, and many others of the 
corporate rogues’ gallery, involved whether these organizations, or rather, the people 
speaking on their behalf, told the truth – whether they disclosed what needed to be 
disclosed or had said something that was intended to mislead investors or others who 
might be expected to rely on their statements.  If Nike had gotten what it wanted, a 
constitutional shield for such statements, would Sarbanes-Oxley matter?46  Or would a 
constitutional defense be available which would trump any legislative intervention?  
Although the proponents of freedom for commercial expression claim that such 
protection is needed because without it the debate will be unbalanced because one 
speaker is unduly chilled, one need not look much farther than the infamous “McLibel” 
case in the U.K. to see what is wrong with this argument.47  In this case McDonald’s sued 
two impecunious members of London Greenpeace for libel on the basis of their 
distribution of leaflets that protested a number of McDonald’s business practices, 
primarily on environmental, labor and nutritional issues.  The lawsuit came at the end of 
43
 “Unlike groups of citizens, who must always debate the proper and shifting balance of conflicting values, 
corporations will pursue a single value to the detriment of all others.” Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra
note 11 at 1051.  “There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.” Hansmann and Kraakman, The End of History 
for Corporate Law, supra note 17, 89 GEORGETOWN L.J. at 439. For a critique of the notion that this state 
of affairs is unproblematic because a broader than ever class of persons own stock, primarily through 
pension funds, see Paddy Ireland, Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth, 68 THE MODERN 
L. REV. 49 (2005).  This is also to some extent an oversimplification.  See infra note 63 and accompanying 
text.  See also EDWARD N. WOLFF, TOP HEAVY: A STUDY OF THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF 
WEALTH IN AMERICA (2002).
44
 For example, in the Nike suit, the plaintiff Kasky alleged that in 1997 Nike spent “almost $1 billion” 
dollars on advertising and promotion.  Kasky v. Nike, Inc., Amended Complaint at 5, Case No. 994446 (Jul 
2, 1998).
45
 I have analyzed this aspect of Nike’s claim in some detail in an earlier piece.  Tamara R. Piety, 
Grounding Nike: Exposing Nike’s Quest for a Constitutional Right to Lie, 78 TEMPLE L. REV. 151 (2005).
46
 Some observers have argued that Sarbanes-Oxley is mostly not responsive to fixing the problems that led 
to the Enron fiasco and that many of its provisions are likely to do little to advance the goal of greater 
corporate responsibility.  See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
47 See http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/index.html.  A feature length documentary was recently released 
about the case.  See http://www.spannerfilms.net/?lid=161 “McLibel: The Postman and the Gardner Who 
Took on McDonald’s” (last visited on Aug. 27, 2005).
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a period of several months during which McDonald’s hired private investigators to 
infiltrate London Greenpeace’s meetings.48  At the conclusion of this period of 
surveillance, McDonald’s sued five members of the group and extracted apologies and 
retractions from them with the threat of libel liability49 – from all that is but Helen Steel 
and David Morris.  They refused to apologize and so McDonald’s sued.  Steel and Morris 
were too poor to hire legal representation and were clearly not economic competitors,50
yet McDonalds saw fit to launch what became the longest trial in English history51 in 
order to “stop people telling lies.”52  Because of the single-mindedness of corporate 
purpose, profit, corporations’ management is most interested in freedom of expression 
(particularly freedom from liability) for the corporations’ speech.  They are less keen to 
extend the freedom of expression to others – even when those others offer very little 
commercial threat and appear to be engaged in quintessential political speech activities.53
Still, perhaps it might be said that McDonald’s was acting in this case no 
differently than a natural person might.  As Thomas Emerson noted, “It has been 
common for individuals and groups who demanded freedom of expression for themselves 
to insist that it be denied to others.”54  Although it might be argued that disparity in 
resources and abilities to project one’s message are just a necessary corollary of freedom, 
this argument focuses too much on the way corporate “persons” might be said to 
resemble natural persons and glosses over their very significant structural and moral 
differences from natural persons, differences that suggest that corporate entities neither 
need, nor should be granted the sorts of liberal speech rights that are (theoretically) the 
birthright of natural persons.  In this essay I review some of those differences and argue 
that both in theory and in practice it is not only permissible to differentiate between 
natural and “legal” persons but necessary to do so in order to retain even a modicum of 
governmental impact on important social goals.
48 See http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/trial/story.html (last visited on Aug. 27, 2005).
49
 McDonald’s had earlier extracted apologies and retractions from some media organizations which had 
reproduced the leaflet or discussed the claims. Id.
50 Id.
51
“McLibel” pair win legal case: Two activists should have been given legal aid in their long fight against 
a McDonald’s libel action, a court says, BBC NEWS UK EDITION, Feb. 15, 2005.
52 Statement distributed by McDonald’s Restaurants, Ltd. via leaflets in McDonald’s restaurants in 
London in April and May of 1994, explaining why it was suing Steel and Morris.  Available at
http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/pretrial/factsheet_ reply.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
53
 Lest anyone think that the McLibel case represented an anomaly because of the relative strictness of 
English libel law and that corporations would not think to launch similar suppression efforts in the United 
States, one has only to look at the Fox case brought against comedian Al Franken. See infra note 149.  That 
case was quickly dismissed. Id. Yet it is an indication both of the incentive structure, that is, what will be 
attempted if possible, and of which way the opinion seems to be moving since it is arguably remarkable 
that Fox’s lawyers didn’t dismiss out of hand as unwarranted by existing law, see FED.R.CIV.P. 11(b)(2), 
the theory proposed by their client. Indeed, that is part of what makes it such a good example, that the court 
and most obserevers seemed to think the claim was facially ridiculous.  Apparently it wasn’t ridiculous 
enough to deter Fox’s lawyers.  For a survey of much more troubling cases where corporations have been 
more successful in suppressing expression see Vladeck, Lessons From a Story Untold, supra note 42 at 
112-118 and accompanying text.  For a book length treatment of the subject see KEMBREW MCLEOD, 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTHER ENEMIES OF CREATIVITY
(Doubleday, 2005).
54
 Thomas Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 888 (1963).
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The argument is in three parts.  First, in Part I, I review the structure and laws 
governing corporations (at least in the United States) to explore the theory of corporate 
personhood and its implications as well as the structural incentives that reduce all 
corporate communication to a single aim - profits.55  Part II takes Thomas Emerson’s 
seminal work on the theoretical basis for protecting freedom of expression and argues 
that none of the arguments Emerson identifies offer any grounds, let alone compelling 
ones, for granting anything like complete protection to commercial expression by 
corporations. Part III addresses some of the persistent counter-arguments and why they 
should not represent an obstacle to limitations on corporate speech. In conclusion, I argue 
these factors suggest that treating corporations as entitled to the same rights to freedom of 
expression as human beings represents a gross distortion of the values freedom of 
expression is meant to protect and imperils legitimate governmental health, safety and 
other social welfare goals without the prospect of any offsetting gains or realistic checks 
on the predictable abuse of power by corporations to be forthcoming from any sources 
other than government.
PART I – The Structure of A Corporation
It appears to have always been a matter of some conceptual difficulty how the law 
ought to deal with corporations. The idea that corporations are “persons” for purposes of 
the law is one of long standing.56  Initially, corporations were thought to have a right to 
existence based upon the grant of a charter from the government.57  But the 
understanding was that such charters were to be sparingly granted and only where the 
proposed corporate enterprise served some greater purpose for the common good rather 
than merely the maximization of wealth for investors.  As a creature of the state the 
corporation was entirely subject to the state, which often prescribed in some detail how 
the corporation was to be governed internally. This concept of the corporation – with its 
quasi-public function and strict regulation by government situates the corporation as a 
kind of extension of the government.58
However, from the beginning, this notion of charter was mitigated somewhat by 
being interpreted as a charter that had been negotiated with the government in question 
and thus also involved contractual rights that once established could be protected from 
interference.59 As the use of the corporate form expanded, this understanding, of the 
55
 Although there continue to be arguments that corporate goals are more nuanced than pure profit, 
certainly short-term profit, it is still fair to say that profit in some form is the only goal on which there is 
unanimity of opinion regarding its legitimacy.
56 See supra note 34.
57 See HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, supra note 34 at 72 -73.
58 See, e.g., Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995). ([W]here, as here, the 
Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and 
retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation, the 
corporation is part of the Government for purposes of the First Amendment.”).
59 See Trustees of Darmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (a corporation only 
possesses the attributes that its charter bestow upon it and it does so to the same degree a natural person 
would have such rights via contract and thus the state could not unilaterally amend that contract).
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meaning of the corporate form, seemed less suitable or even practicable once states began 
to enter into a competition to offer the most attractive legal environment for incorporation 
by relaxing or dispensing with much of the regulatory supervision.60  “Gradually, by 
making the corporate form universally available, free incorporation undermined the grant 
theory.  Incorporation eventually came to be regarded not as a special state-conferred 
privilege but as a normal and regular mode of doing business.”61  Instead of being a 
creature of the law the corporate form seemed a natural and reasonable form of 
organization for the conduct of business, a form for which there was no burning need for 
government to micro-manage outside of those industries that might be deemed “natural 
monopolies” and thus still fitting somewhat comfortably into this schema that required 
corporations to serve a “public” function.
As the free incorporation model came to predominate, the entity theory and 
notions of corporate personhood continued to gain ground.  “By rendering the corporate 
form normal and regular, late-nineteenth-century corporate theory shifted the 
presumption of corporate regulation against the state.  Since corporations could no longer 
be treated as special creatures of the state, they were entitled to the same privileges as all 
other individuals and groups.”62  So today it apparently seems completely natural and 
reasonable for corporations’ representatives to claim that the corporation has expressive 
rights as an aspect of personhood.  But it is important to remember that the metaphor of 
corporate personhood is just that.  A metaphor.  Nevertheless, this metaphor elides 
several aspects of the corporate form that make corporate expression relentlessly one-
sided and, ultimately, untrustworthy.
The Primacy of the Profit Motive
Pursuant to conventional interpretations of black letter corporate law the 
corporation’s officers and directors have primarily one duty – to maximize shareholder 
value.63  Furthermore, this duty accrues not to the real people who happen to be 
shareholders and the multiplicity of concerns that they can be expected to have as human 
60 See, e.g., HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 34 at 73.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 74.
63
 As Professor Elhauge has pointed out, this “black letter” law has always been fairly significantly 
modified by the business judgment rule in a fashion that not only permits some profit-sacrificing behavior 
but actually virtually guarantees it because of the moral and social pressures on managers.  See Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits, supra note 17 80 N.Y. U. L. REV.  at 740-4.  However, even Professor 
Elhauge agrees that profit maximization is the management’s “primary obligation” to shareholders.  Id. at 
745. The business judgment rule arguably represents an implicit understanding that transferring the 
decision to the courts of what specific action would be “profit maximizing” in any particular situation 
would result in significant increases in transaction costs and that the resultant inefficiency would virtually 
guarantee further reductions in profits.  Nevertheless, the existence of such discretion represents no 
assurance that the discretion will be exercised in a manner consistent with the public interest.  See, The 
Good Company, THE ECONOMIST, January 22-28th, 2005 (Special section at 3-22).  Moreover, this 
conventional understanding has been trenchantly criticized by Professor Daniel Greenwood.  See 
Greenwood, Daniel J.H., "Are Shareholders Entitled to the Residual?" (September 2, 2005). Utah Legal 
Studies Paper No. 05-10 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=799144.
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beings.  Rather, this duty only accrues to a fictional shareholder who cares for nothing 
but short-term financial gain.  
[H]uman shareholders who are also neighbors or employees or customers or 
friends may have other commitments beyond an extra nickel in the quarterly 
dividend. Even on purely economic issues, since shareholdings in this country are 
not only wide but shallow, many shareholders will find that their basic interests 
are aligned more with employees, stability or customers than with the highest 
possible value for their shareholdings: a decrease in your phone bill is likely to be 
worth more to you than the commensurate drop in the price of the telephone 
company shares held by your pension fund. Only foreign shareholders with little 
connection to the American economy or politics beyond their shareholdings 
approximate this conventional image of a shareholder always interested in higher 
stock returns.64
Since the fictional shareholder is just an investor, it is immortal and time 
indifferent--the market allows any investor to transform future income into 
present income, short term gains into long terms ones, and so on, simply by 
applying the correct discount rate. It is context indifferent--since money is 
perfectly fungible, a pure shareholder is indifferent between money earned in Salt 
Lake City or Cambridge; Flint or Manilla. It has no commitment to particular 
enterprises: so long as the investment is on the capital frontier, offering the 
appropriate risk adjusted rate of return, one project is as good as any other. Tin 
cans and insurance, news magazines and amusement parks--what the company 
does is a matter of entire indifference. It is universalist in the modernist, not the 
post-identity, sense: the fictional shareholder recognizes no boundaries, professes 
no nationality (or, more precisely, will change nationalities at the current or future 
monetary exchange rate), has no religion, no community, no union, no gender 
and, oddly enough, no class: the invested funds of the unions are no different from 
the invested funds of the capitalists against which they struggle. It is, in short, 
radically uncommitted, cosmopolitan, deracinated, tied to no religion, language, 
nation or community. Perhaps most important for bargaining purposes, the 
shareholder is fully mobile--able to leap borders (and professions, commitments 
and projects) at a single bound.65
This vision of the shareholder has a lot in common with the economists’ darling, 
the rational person, primarily in its lack of correspondence in characteristics to any real 
person since real human beings are not so narrowly focused.  Yet, like the fictional 
rational person, the fictional rational shareholder offers analysts and managers an 
64
 Greenwood, supra note 11 at 1036.  It may be that Greenwood underestimates the degree to which 
institutional investors, primarily the managers of pension funds, do behave this way because the 
aggregation of many shareholders into a fund has the same affect – this is, of reducing the variety of 
shareholder interests to a single value, profit.  However, the growth of institutional funds that are formed 
with the objective of investing only in certain types of companies may have made the fictional shareholder 
model less relevant as an empirical matter than in times past.  However, my sense is that such investment 
funds still represent the minority of investors.  They are also not indifferent to profit.
65 Id. at 1043 (internal footnotes omitted).
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attractively simple, and comparatively straightforward way to analyze performance since 
attempting to address all the multiplicity of factors that may actually motivate 
shareholders would probably be impossibly complex and certainly unwieldy.  So the 
fictional shareholder continues to be the yardstick against which management and 
analysts measure the performance of a company.
The only limitations on how corporations carry out that duty to shareholders are 
those imposed by law, that is, what the law says they can and cannot do in aid of 
maximizing shareholder value.  That makes corporate “behavior” and “speech” very 
narrow, shallow and one-dimensional.  All roads, all expression, all actions, lead back to 
the (hoped for, if often unrealized) maximization of shareholder value.  That makes the 
corporation a very unusual “person” since few people can be said to hold one, and only 
one value. It might, additionally, be protested that it is an inaccurate picture since, 
because corporations are run by persons, and persons do have other interests, that those 
interests and personalities inevitably are reflected in the corporation.  To a limited extent 
this is true.  
Around the margins of the ambiguity about what exactly is best for shareholders –
long run stability, short term gain, corporate image, etc., the personalities and the choices 
made by a corporation’s executive can and do make a difference – and not solely in the 
negative ways of a Dennis Kozlowski or a Jeffrey Skilling, but also in positive ways such 
as a Warren Buffet or a Ray Anderson.66  Additionally, the business judgment rule and 
management perceptions of what sorts of profit-sacrificing behavior is appropriate and 
necessary to conform to social norms, allows for some behavior that is not 
straightforwardly profit-seeking to occur.67  Still, ultimately the relentless forces of the 
market, and the legal imperatives supporting resort to the market, force even the most 
vociferous advocates of a “different” kind of corporate model into the same old model—
certainly this is the case with respect to large, public corporations. Thus, Anita Roddick, 
founder of The Body Shop, had to step down from her position as chair of the company 
and relinquish control of the company, including its much vaunted social responsibility 
programs.68  Ben and Jerry’s was bought by Unilever.69  As Professor Joel Bakan reports, 
Roddick’s successor at The Body Shop asserted, “We believe in social responsibility but 
we are very hard-nosed about profit.  We know that success is measured by the bottom 
line.”70 “Roddick’s story illustrates how an executive’s moral concerns and altruistic 
desires must ultimately succumb to her corporations overriding goals.”71
66
 Ray Anderson is “the founder and chairman of Interface, Inc., the world’s largest commercial carpet 
manufacturer,” and an outspoken proponent of a switch to manufacturing processes that contribute to 
sustainability.  BAKAN, supra note 15 at 71.
67 See Elhauge, supra note 17.
68 BAKAN, supra note 15 at 51-53.
69
 Janger, supra 2 at 74 (citing Ben and Jerry’s Financial History, available at 
http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/research_library/fin/ (last visited on Aug. 24, 2005).
70 BAKAN, supra note 15 at 53.  
71 Id.  It is worth noting that Roddick has been questioned about the consistency of these goals in a number 
of quarters with claims that her much vaunted values have been (how ironic) more cosmetic than 
substantive. See, e.g., STAUBER AND RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE, supra note 32 at 73 -76 (exploring 
conflicts between Body Shop founder’s stated business objectives and principles and the actual conduct of 
the company).
15
Although the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility [CSR], that is the practice of 
a corporation taking account of the interests of constituencies beyond shareholders,72 has 
gained popularity, that movement suffers from the absence of a legal structure that will 
offer officers and directors clear guidance on what is a permissible departure from the 
pure profit, shareholder maximization, model.  One the one hand, as Professor Einer 
Elhauge points out, the business judgment rule and existing structures are capacious 
enough to protect judgments that trade off short tem profits for long term benefits.73  So 
shifting between long and short term payoffs could (theoretically) offer no obstacle to the 
implementation of CSR.  On the other hand, when the magnitude of long term gains are 
difficult to predict with any certainty, or are intangible, management could still 
conceivably expose themselves to shareholder liability if the alleged long term benefits 
are intangible enough and the sacrificed short term profits (or costs incurred) are very 
large for and CSR project.74
In addition, there are no clear definition of what “corporate social responsibility” 
consists of and very little in the way of standards assessing it.75  “[C]ompanies fasten the 
label to a quite bewildering variety of supposedly enlightened, progressive or charitable 
corporate actions.”76  Moreover, the results are inconsistent.  
This may be why The Economist offered the editorial opinion that CSR was ill 
conceived.  
The goal of a well-run company may be to make profits for its shareholders, but 
merely in doing that – provided it faces the competition in its markets, behaves 
honestly and obeys the law77 – the company, without even trying, is doing good 
works.  Its employees willingly work for the company in exchange for wages; the 
transaction makes them better off. Its customers willing pay for the company’s 
products; the transaction makes them better off also.  All the while, for strictly 
selfish reasons, well-run companies will strive for friendly long-term relations 
with employees, suppliers and customers.  There is no need for selfness sacrifice 
when it comes to stakeholders.  It goes with the territory.
***
72 See, e.g., BAUMAN, WEISS & PALMITER, CORPORATIONS LAW & POLICY, supra note 10 at 116-117 
(discussing state statutes providing shelter within business judgment rule for constituencies such as 
employees, suppliers, creditors, etc.); Cynthia Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of 
Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002); Paul Cox, The Public the Private and the 
Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 391 (1997).
73 See Elhauge, supra note 63.
74
 Professor Bakan reports that the famous economist, Milton Friedman suggests that there is only “one 
instance when corporate social responsibility can be tolerated ...—when it is insincere.” BAKAN, THE 
CORPORATION, supra note 15 at  34.
75 The Union of Concerned Executive: CSR as practised means many different things, THE ECONOMIST, 
January 22, 2005 at 6in a special report, A Survey of Corporate Social Responsibility.
76 Id.
77
 This is both a very big “provided” and tautological since the very thing that some CSR proponents are 
suggesting is that the law require it.  Thus, “obeying the law” provides both no inkling of the law’s content 
and no limitation.
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All things considered, there is much to be said for leaving social and economic 
policy to governments.  They are least accountable to voters.78
That this rosy picture contains a number of enormous caveats or questionable 
empirical assumptions seems obvious.79  From the beginning of this country’s existence 
the question of what sorts of regulatory limits should be placed on the pursuit of the 
accumulation of capital and whether it can always be said that what is in the best interest 
of business is necessarily in the best interest of society as well has been an issue of fierce 
debate and fluctuating legislative trends.  The existence of the minimum wage and 
antitrust laws, just to mention two examples, would seem to suggest that public sentiment 
has not always found the two, corporate interests and the public interest, to be 
coextensive.  Nevertheless, this argument seems to have enjoyed a resurgence in the later 
part of the 20th century and into our present time.80  So it is worthwhile to reiterate what 
may seem to be obvious questions.  First, the editorial offers the observation that, of 
course, the company may only maximize profits within the limits of the law.  But when it 
comes to corporate speech, this may be precisely the problem: What does the law permit?  
If it permits lying, does a corporation have a duty to do so?  And if the law virtually 
demands that the company communicate in ways that are deceptive, it is difficult to see 
how that adds to the general well-being, even if one were inclined to accept the other 
dubious assertions about workers and consumers always being “better” off as a result of 
this imperative.  In fact, there is little reason to expect that they will be.
Corporations as Externalizing Machines 
Corporations generate what economists call “externalities,” that is cost to others 
associated with the production of their goods and services.  Something is “external” by 
virtue of its cost being absorbed outside the company.81  Environmental pollution is a 
familiar example of an externality.  Less familiar, perhaps more subtle externalities might 
be the social costs to individuals of the requirement that human capital, particularly for 
top executives, be highly mobile82 or requiring working hours incompatible with raising a 
family or caring for an elderly parent or other dependent person.83  “The corporation [] is 
78 The Good Company, THE ECONOMIST, January 22, 2005 at 11. 
79
 Characterizing workers as “willingly” working in exchange for wages when some sort of work is 
necessary for survival for most people and where the wage for most work is set by the employer, not 
negotiated by the worker borders is disingenuous.  Claiming that consumers are better off for having 
“willingly” paid for products that were relentlessly promoted to them and which they may not need or may 
be affirmatively hazardous to their health (such as cigarettes) borders on the delusional.
80 See, e.g., Hansmann and Kraakman, supra note 17.
81
 Identifying internal and external may be very sensitive to assessments of causal relationships.  For 
example, if rootlessness contributes to reduced social support networks and long hours add to stress and 
both make workers more vulnerable to depression, alcoholism and drug abuse or other mental disorders or 
to stress-related physical ailments like heart-attacks, the corporation does not succeed in completely 
externalizing costs because of lost worker productivity, health care costs and the like.  However these 
connections are disputed.
82 See Peter T. Kilborn, The Five Bedroom, Six Figure Rootless Life, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 1, 
2005.
83 See Marleen O’Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future 
Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1255 (2004).
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an externalizing machine, in the same way that a shark is a killing machine.”84  “The 
corporation [] is deliberately programmed, indeed legally compelled, to externalize costs 
without regard for the harm it may cause to people, communities and the natural 
environment.”85
This doesn’t make the corporation form evil, just amoral.86  If slave labor became 
legal, corporations might arguably have a duty to engage in it under the current legal 
regime.87  If it became legal to kill rival executives, or steal trade secrets, or kill people 
for lucrative body parts, then presumably all corporations would do those things too – not 
just the renegade few. It is the law that sets these limits. Because a corporation has “no 
body to kick and no soul to damn,”88 these penalties largely consist of monetary 
penalties.  But calibrating the amount of the penalty to represent a real disincentive has 
always been difficult.  And because the profits are so enormous, the penalties assume a 
size that, taken in a vacuum, seem self-evidently excessive to some.  But if it looked at in 
the context of the amount at stake may not seem so excessive.  For example, the recent 
$253.5 million dollar verdict entered against Merck in the Vioxx case included a figure 
84 BAKAN, supra note 15 at 70 quoting businessman Robert Monks from an interview with the author.
85 Id. at 72-73.
86
 In a recent article Professor Douglas Litowitz asks the question, “Are Corporations Evil?” and concludes 
that although there is much to be said for what he calls the criticisms of the structural problems in the 
organization of corporations, he concludes that it is actually size, not the corporate form which is most at 
fault. Douglas Litowitz, Are Corporations Evil?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 814-15 (2004).  He notes that 
most corporate critics don’t extend their criticisms to “mom-and-pop corporations.” Id.  He has a point and 
many of the observations here apply only to the large, publicly held corporations.  However, given that 
some observers consider the close corporation virtually “obsolete” and that large scale partnerships and 
limited partnerships that Litowitz identifies as occasionally perpetrators of misconduct that makes the 
news, operate under the same imperatives for profit, focus on the form may be just an argument about 
details.  All of the arguments herein can be applied to the partnership or other business organizational 
forms to the extent that they diffuse responsibility and focus on profits for shareholders, partners or 
investors.  The key may be whether there is any real accountability to anyone but themselves.
87
 Some would say that corporations like Nike (or its subcontractors) already do engage in something that 
falls short of “slave labor” only insofar as it does not include legal ownership of employees’ person, but 
otherwise involves much of its aspects – lack of real freedom, oppressive working conditions, physical 
punishment, control through sexual battery, etc.  See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., Amended Complaint, supra note 
44 at 10-15 (describing alleged corporeal punishment and other oppressive labor practices of Nike sub-
contractors’ factories in Vietnam, Indonesia and China).  But one doesn’t need to travel outside of the U.S. 
to encounter businesses willing to engage in tactics bordering on the employment of slave labor.  The use 
of illegal immigrants as migrant farmer workers who are controlled by the threat of disclosure to the 
authorities offer one persistent example.  And in Tulsa, Oklahoma, a local business was charged with 
slavery for allegedly importing workers from India and then holding them hostage on the premises, denying 
them adequate wages, freedom of movement, etc. that would enable them to leave.  The employer, John 
Pickle Co., was found to have violated minimum wage laws by importing workers from India for what it 
described as a “training” program, even though the workers were actually highly skilled welders and the 
like, so as to evade the minimum wage law.  Michael Overall, Verdict blasts Pickle: The company 
displaced U.S. workers with cheap foreign labor a judge rules in part one of the trial, TULSA WORLD at 
A1, 8/27/2004.  Those workers also alleged that the company held them prisoner in a factory dormitory, 
confiscated their passports and other documents and would not allow them to leave the factory even when 
off duty and had lied to them about the status of the immigration visas that would be obtained for them. Id.
88 NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA, supra note 34 at 5 (“As Baron Thurlow said some three centuries ago, ‘Did 
you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be 
kicked?’”).
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for punitive damages that was “not picked at random.”89 Rather it was a figure pulled 
from “a 2001 Merck estimate of additional profit the company might make if it could 
delay an F.D.A. warning on Vioxx’s heart risk.” 90  Note the calculus that Merck engaged 
in – what truthful communication would cost it. Nevertheless, because defendants such 
as Merck have successfully managed to convince the public and the legislatures to focus 
on the size of such verdicts in isolation, they have succeeded in securing the passage of 
caps on liability that reduce such awards, and thereby diminish their effectiveness as 
penalties.91
Even these limits will be exceeded if a corporation’s executives conclude that the 
penalties exacted by the law will not diminish profits sufficient to represent a deterrence 
to similar misconduct in the future.92  As Professor Bakan observes, “Corporate 
illegalities are rife throughout the economy.  Many major corporations engage in 
unlawful behavior, and some are habitual offenders with records that would be the envy 
of even the most prolific human criminals.”93  As an example he lists the 42 violations or 
judgments, most relating to environmental issues, against General Electric for the period 
between 1990 and 2001.94
On the other hand, not all outcomes driven by the profit motive are necessarily 
bad.  If images and entertainment about gay and lesbians are more prominent in the 
culture it may have a lot to do with manufacturers playing to a market.95  Many of us 
view this as a morally worthwhile phenomenon that contributes to a more inclusive 
society.  But not everyone agrees.96  And those who don’t could point to this as another 
outgrowth of the “immorality” of corporate tunnel vision with respect to the profit 
motive.  Similarly, many companies have integrated the images in their advertising to 
include more people of color, more women (outside of advertising for cosmetics, clothing 
and the like) and have discovered it “pays” to recognize the Hispanic market or the 
89
 Alex Berenson, For Merck, the Vioxx Paper Trail Won’t Go Away, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sunday, 
August 21, 2005, 1 & 17.  
90 Id. at 17 (emphasis added). 
91
 For example, Texas law caps on punitive damages apparently mean that the Vioxx verdict will be 
automatically reduced to $26.1 million. Id. at 1.
92
 A cap on damages may not completely eliminate the deterrent effect of damage awards where the 
company, as does Merck, faces several thousand lawsuits.  Id.
93 BAKAN, supra, note 15 at 75.
94 Id. 75- 79.
95 See, e.g., David M. Skover & Kellye Y. Testy, Lesbigay Idenitiy as Commodity, 90 CAL. L. REV. 223 
(2002).
96 See Russell Shorto, What's Their Real Problem With Gay Marriage? It's the Gay Part, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Late Edition - Final, Section 6 , Page 34 , Column 1 June 19, 2005 
(recounting the fierce objection on moral grounds, by some anti-gay marriage activists, to homosexual 
behavior on the grounds of a belief that it represents an immoral choice).  The stunning ignorance of 
history, science and any sense of the cultural context for the institution of marriage displayed by some of 
the subjects interviewed for this article is fairly dispiriting if one believes that good government and a good 
society is even, in part, dependent upon information and education.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
individuals interviewed are animated by fervent convictions that they label “moral.”  For another example 
of the profit motive contributing to equality see Ellen Waldman and Marybeth Herald, Eyes Wide Shut: 
Erasing Women’s Experiences from the Clinic to the Courtroom, 28 HARV. J. OF LAW & GENDER 285, 
300-03 (2005).
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African-American market, etc. These may all represent social advances for which we can 
thank corporate indifference to anything but the profit motive – that is, its moral 
neutrality may lead to the morally worthwhile as well as the morally bankrupt.  Of course 
that may represent little net gain if many of the marketing efforts are for harmful 
products.97   Certainly the images of people of color in advertising are arguably still far 
from being representative of the people of color in the population.  The point though is 
that I am not offering any reflexive condemnation of corporations.  They are neither 
moral nor immoral.  They are amoral.  They aren’t people.  While this fact has side 
effects that may be applauded insofar as they are indifferent to any particular moral or 
political position, that is not a feature that offers much protection for the minority view or 
the outsider. 
The . . . internal mechanisms of the corporation do not differentiate between 
making money by creating a good product or lobbying the law to avoid the costs 
of a bad one. A corporation driven by the profit motive is morally indifferent: it 
will lobby to repeal the eight hour day or the EPA, or, alternatively, invest in 
additional automation or pollution control devices indifferently, based only on a 
cost benefit analysis of which option is likely to cost the shares less. It will 
compete with a competitor, or lobby to create a legally regulated monopoly, 
indifferent except as to the relative risk-adjusted projected net present values of 
the alternatives. It will adapt to a world of long-term employment and family 
wages, or advocate one of employee mobility, over-work for some and under-
employment for the rest, entirely indifferent to effects on children or civil society 
because those effects are not reflected in the returns to the shares.98
In addition to the primacy of the profit motive directed toward the fictional 
shareholder and driving the corporation to externalize any costs that it can, the large, 
publicly traded corporations are also bureaucracies that increase the potential to diffuse 
and dissipate whatever individual, human moral impulses its officers, directors and 
employees may have and to contribute ambiguity about moral and legal responsibilities 
on the part of employees, 99 a convenient instrument for suppressing guilt feelings about 
particular transactions100 and a difficulty in locating responsibility when things do go 
wrong.101  Given these features of corporate structure the notion that corporations require 
special protection for their expression is troubling.  It is difficult to locate any support for 
this claim in the theoretical basis on which freedom of expression is protected.
97 See, e.g., Michael Fletcher, Tobacco’s Ties to Minority Groups Put Their Leaders in a Bind, Washington 
Post, (May 17, 1998) (available at http://www.columbia.edu/itc/hs/pubhealth/p9740/readings/tobacco-
fletcher.html )(last visited Aug. 13, 12005) (“Native Americans and African Americans have the highest 
smoking rates in the nation, and African Americans are more likely than others to die from smoking-related 
diseases.”).
98
 Greenwood, supra note 11 at 1053 (emphasis added).
99 See, e.g., Jayne O’Donnell, Blowing the whistle can lead to harsh aftermath, despite law, USA TODAY  
at 1 (Aug. 1, 2005)
100 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of the Criminal Law in Preventing 
Corporate Crime, in RAPOPORT AND DHARAN, ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS, supra note 2 at 431, 448-
50.
101 Id. at 450-52.
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PART – II  Theory and Practice in Protection for Freedom of Expression
Some of those who consider themselves First Amendment purists are fond of 
offering a quote attributed to Voltaire along the lines (and I paraphrase), “I disagree with 
everything you say but will defend to the death your right to say it,” in support of what is 
often described as an absolutist position on the protection of speech.  However, at no time 
in this country’s history has anything like an absolutist position on the application of the 
First Amendment ever held sway in the government or on the Court.  Reviewing the 
decisions of the Supreme Court on issues of speech one is left with the uncomfortable 
feeling that the government is somewhat willing to permit the hostile speech of the 
ineffectual crackpots and malcontents and very much less sanguine about hostile or 
critical speech when it even appears to pose a threat to some government project or 
plan.102  Still, this observation also highlights the fact that one of the principal concerns 
supporting the right to freedom of expression is concern about the mandate of a 
governmental orthodoxy.103
Nevertheless, as Professor Fredrick Schauer and others have so convincingly 
demonstrated, it has never been the case that all speech was equal for purposes of 
protection under the First Amendment.104  There has never been in theory a First 
Amendment defense to a fraud claim, or to an offer of a bribe or a solicitation of a 
murder.  All of these may be acts committed by speech, but that speech has not been 
102
 For example, the Bush Administration recently asked the National Academy of Sciences to refrain from 
publishing a work on biological terrorism by a Stanford researcher.  “The paper ... details how terrorists 
might attack the nation’s milk supply with botulinum toxin and offers suggestions for how to thwart such 
an attack.”  Kelly Field, Federal Officials Ask Journal Not to Publish Bioterrorism Paper, THE 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, June 17, 2005 at A11.
103
 “[T]he First Amendment ‘presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gather out of a 
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.” Brief for Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. 
Kaksy, 2003 WL 899100 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2003) at 50.  Most of Nike’s amici also suggested that the truth 
was more likely to be arrived at through permission for Nike to speak, although note that what was at issue 
was not whether Nike would be permitted to speak, but whether it would be liable for damages if what it 
said wasn’t true.  The concerns about the chilling effect raised in the concurring and dissenting opinions, 
see supra note 42, suggest in the Nike case presumably also rest on the assumption that a “chill” is to be 
avoided because more speech is better because it will more likely lead to the discovery of the truth.  This 
theme was echoed by many of the media reports on the case, see Jonathan Rauch, Corporate Lying Is Bad. 
But Allowing It Is Good, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 10, 2003 
(http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/rauch2003-06-10.htm); Associated Press, If Nike suit upheld, a 
critic becomes a censor, solicitor says, USA TODAY, June 28, 2003) 
(http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2003-04-23-nike-s.. ), as well as the amicus brief filed 
by some 40 media organizations. See Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading Newspaper, Magazines, 
Broadcaster, Wire Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade Associations in Support of 
Petitioners, 2003 WL 835613 (U.S., Feb. 28, 2003) (arguing that a decision for Kasky would represent an 
undesirable chill on news sources from corporations as well as resulting in a lack of balance in reporting on 
issues).
104
 Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VANDERBILT L. 
REV. 265, 270-71 (1981).  See also Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L. J. 1, 21 (1971) (“In framing a theory of free speech the first obstacle is the insistence of many 
very intelligent people that the “first amendment is an absolute.”...Any such reading is of course 
impossible.”).
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thought to be protected by the First Amendment.  Until fairly recently, commercial 
speech fell into this unprotected category.  Commercial speech, or speech by 
corporations, (and the definition of what constitutes “commercial speech” is contentious 
and unsettled)105 was only extended protection in the late 70’s.106  So there is no 
venerable tradition supporting freedom of expression for corporations.107
So what sort of speech was protected and why?  In so complicated an area where 
no hard and fast lines exist, it is not really possible to fully answer this question as the 
scope of protection appears to have always been a work in progress, a tug-of-war 
between political currents and powerful interests.  But it is possible to identify with some 
precision some of the theoretical grounds for protection of freedom of expression, even if 
the practical application of those theories, or the question of whether there is any 
empirical fit between the theory and practice, are distinct questions.  Thomas Emerson, 
the prominent First Amendment theorist proposed four purposes for protecting freedom 
of expression and despite tweakings of this formula, or claims that no unifying theory is 
possible, Emerson’s architecture of the theory for why freedom of expression is protected
remains one of the most influential.108
First, Emerson claimed freedom of expression is a necessary part of self-
expression and thus of personal fulfillment.109  Second, as has been repeated in numerous 
court decisions and academic writings, freedom of expression is thought to be the best 
method of ensuring discovery of truth.110  (It was on this ground, refusal to shield 
consumers from the truth, that a limited amount of protection for commercial speech was 
105
 For an excellent discussion of the definition problem see Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk, What 
is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 1143 
(2004). While I do not agree with the place where the authors draw the line between what constitutes 
“commercial” speech (since I would include all for profit corporate communication, including that in the 
editorial format), this article clearly outlines the current doctrinal ambiguities. 
106
 The Virginia Pharmacy decision in 1976 is generally credited with establishing the commercial speech 
doctrine because it was in this decision that the Court first articulated a developed theory for some limited 
protection for commercial speech.  See supra note 30.  However, another candidate is the earlier decision of 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) in which the Court held that a newspaper publisher could not be 
prohibited by the criminal law from running an ad noting the availability of abortions in New York that 
were illegal in Virginia.  But because the Court’s holding was identified as “limited” it was not rally clear 
what the parameters of protection for commercial speech were, or on what theory it was grounded, until 
Virginia Pharmacy.  See Virginia Pharmacy, supra note 30 at 760.
107 See C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandary in 
Nike, 54 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2004) (“[O]ur strongest advocates of free speech [John 
Stuart Mill, Thomas Emerson, and Hugo Black] each consistently rejected granting any protection to 
commercial speech....Neither Mill nor Black nor Emerson saw freedom of speech as about, or as including, 
a business’s speech promoting its sales and profits.”).
108 See JOHN H. GARVEY & FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER, 2nd ed. (West 
Publishing Co., St. Paul, MN 1996) at 35-123, (Chapt. II – Philosophical Foundations of Freedom of 
Speech) (discussing primarily Emerson’s structure and introducing variations and other arguments in Chapt 
III, entitled Additional Perspectives, at 126-67). 
109
 Emerson, supra note 54 at 878.
110 Id. at 878. This argument was repeated by Nike and by most of the amici supporting Nike.  See supra
note 103.  But see Posner, Bad News, supra note 26 (offering the opinion that the market for news doesn’t 
necessarily produce the truth even if it produces the opportunity to receive information from which one can 
synthesize the truth).
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extended in the first place.)111. Third, freedom of speech is argued to offer a basis for 
participation in a democracy.112  Fourth, Emerson argued freedom of expression helped to 
maintain a balance between impulses to change and those to stability in a society.113
All of these arguments have been offered in support of freedom of commercial
speech.114  In addition, supporters have argued that the failure to protect (that is, render 
immune from liability) commercial speech will have bad policy consequences with 
respect to corporate transparency and social responsibility reporting115 which in turn is 
argued will have a negative impact on commercial relations with Europe to the extent that 
such transparency is required in order to do business there.116  It has also been argued that 
111 See Virginia Pharmacy supra note 30 at 763-65.
112
 Emerson, supra note 54 at 878.  This argument is also the one offered by Alexander Meiklejohn in his 
influential writing on First Amendment theory.  See, e.g., Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is 
an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (1961)  It is worth noting that Meiklejohn’s observation, that the 
First Amendment doesn’t require that every citizen speak to all issues, “but that everything worth saying 
shall be said,” also seems to be based on notions that allowing everything worthwhile will be a better route 
to discovery of the truth since it is hard to imagine that “worthwhile” doesn’t encompass “true” as part of 
its value although it may not be either a necessary or complete description of what Meiklejohn thought 
“worthwhile” meant.  See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF 
GOVERNMENT (1948) at 25.
113
 Emerson, supra note 54 at 878-79.  To make things even more complicated, Schauer argues that it may 
be a mistake to look for a single “core” value rather than a multiplicity of values underlying protection for 
speech.  Schauer, supra note 104 at 276-77.
114
 Professor James Weinstein offered one the latest rebuttals of the first two arguments.  According to 
Weinstein both the self actualization and truth arguments are supported by the decisions.  See, James 
Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons From Nike v. 
Kasky, 54 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1100-01 (2004).
115 See Brief for Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, supra note 103 at 39 (noting that Nike had not released its 
Corporate Responsibility Report because of fears of liability unless the California Supreme Court’s 
decision was overturned).  Not everyone agrees that the decision hurts corporate social responsibility 
reporting.  Some argument that without the ability to test the truth of such reporting the usefulness of it will 
be minimal. See Adam M. Kanzer and Cynthia A. Williams, The Future of Social Reporting Is On the Line, 
Business Ethics (Summer 2003) (http://www.business-ethics.com/nike_vs_kasky.htm (“[V]irtually 
everything a company says is commercial speech, and must be accurate.”).  We might have some reason to 
question the sincerity of Nike’s alleged reluctance to issue a Corporate Responsibility Report since it in fact 
issued one for 2004 despite the fact that although it had settled the Kasky case, the judicial precedent from 
the California Supreme Court, with its allegedly “chilling” definition of commercial speech, has not been 
withdrawn and is still the law.  See nikebiz.com press release, April 16, 2005, Nike Issues FY04 Corporate 
Responsibility Report Highlighting Multi-Stakeholder Engagement and New Levels of Transparency, 
available at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/news/pressrelease_print.jhtnl?year=2005&month=04&letter).  Of 
course Nike’s renewed confidence in the safety of such reporting may be due to their success in 
contributing to an effort in California to pass law reform to remove the private attorneys general provision 
that allowed Kasky to sue on behalf of the citizens of California. See 2004 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. (Proposition 
64) [Approved by voters November 2, 2005].  Now with only the state and federal government able to sue, 
perhaps Nike’s management feels that with the appropriate lobbying efforts there is not much to fear from 
the governments and, given the response to their arguments, another lawsuit might simply offer them the 
opportunity to get from the courts the additional protection they seek.  Ironically, the 2004 corporate 
responsibility report’s disclosures suggest that Kasky’s allegations may have been true.
116 See, e.g., Thomas H. Clarke, Jr., Will Nike v. Kasky Ignite Corporate Social Responsibility Trade Wars 
between the U.S. and European Union ?, SRI Media, Corporate Governance News, (June 28, 2003) 
(http://www.srimedia.com/artman/publish/article_419.shtml) (“Those companies that do not publish CSR 
reports, or generally obfuscate their positions on matter diverse as global warming to supply chain 
economics, will be much less inclined to publicize their progress for fear of California litigation.”).
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a failure to offer the same protection to business that is offered to its critics would be 
“unfair” and represent an “imbalance” in the debate.117  (This is perhaps a variation on 
the theory that more open debate is more likely to lead to the truth).  All of these claims 
will be discussed and rebutted in more detail below.
Self-realization
None of Emerson’s theoretical justifications for the protection of freedom of 
expression appear to offer much in the way of support for freedom of commercial 
expression.  First, as a non-human entity a corporation cannot be said to have the 
expressive interests related to self-actualization and freedom that persons do.  As 
Emerson put it, the right to freedom of expression is necessary to human beings because: 
[E]xpression is an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental exploration 
and of the affirmation of self.  The power to realize his potentiality as a human 
being begins at this point and must extend at least this far if the whole nature of 
man is not to be thwarted.118
Corporations don’t have a “self” to be actualized or affirmed.  Its employees may have 
them.  Its shareholders may have them. But corporations don’t.  When a corporation’s 
agents speak on its behalf they are not expressing themselves they are following orders or 
fulfilling duties and they are doing so responsive to the corporation’s single objective: 
Profit maximization. Thus, 
[c]orporate speech is coerced, not free.  It is compelled, legally mandated speech, 
not the result of anyone’s autonomous behavior.  It does not reflect the views of 
shareholders, nor, if management is acting in good faith, those of managers or 
other corporate agents.  Instead, corporate speech reflects the hypothetical 
interests of a creature given reality by the market and the law: the fictional 
shareholder. 119
The fictional shareholder is just that, a fiction, a mental construction no more embodied 
than the “+” in an equation.  It is a principle if you will.  As Professor Greenwood puts it, 
a corporation’s “principal is merely a principle, an abstraction, not a human being.  
[Principles, unlike principals, do not have any autonomy rights to be respected.”120  Nor 
do the people speaking on behalf of the corporation have autonomy rights with respect to 
their expression since it is not their own expression. However much their own creativity 
and interests may align with the corporation’s, at the end of the day they are agents 
speaking on the corporation’s behalf – following orders, whether or not they agree with 
those orders.  And “...as Eichmann has taught us, people who are just following orders 
are neither full moral subjects nor appropriate participants in the difficult debates of the 
political forum.”121
Thus, if there is a justification for the protection for commercial speech self-
expression does not seem to be a part of that justification – at least not speaker self-
117 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading Newspapers, supra note 103.
118
 Emerson, supra note 54 at 879.
119
 Greenwood, supra, note 11 at 1002 (emphasis added).
120
 Greenwood, supra note 11 at 1056.
121
 Greenwood, supra note 11 at 1057.
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expression.122  Still, Professor Martin Redish has suggested that perhaps “the function of 
self-rule is fostered by the receipt of information that enables the individual to make life-
affecting decisions in a more informed fashion.”123  In other words, perhaps by giving 
corporations freedom to speak, more information is generated that in turn supports the 
goal of self-actualization or development.  There may be something to this.  But in this 
sense the speech generated by corporations represents the “clay” from which individuals 
model their statements about self.  But how does false speech that enhances a 
corporation’s profitability enhance this goal other than by making a particular brand of 
symbol, perhaps like the availability of a particular color on the palette of an artist?  And 
if there are significant social costs, for example environmental pollution or perpetuation 
of a labor practice that consumers actually intend to disavow with their purchases but end 
up supporting with them instead – do the expressive benefits of the availability of the 
Nike brand with which to signify something about oneself offset these social costs?  
Arguably they do not.
Traditionally the law has regulated false speech on the grounds of the social costs 
associated with it and the notion that the law has a role in enforcing true in certain 
situations. It is difficult to conclude however, for the reasons explored above that for 
profit corporations will ever disseminate unfavorable information except under 
compulsion.124  However, much of the speech issued by for profit corporations is 
persuasive speech that is not necessarily informative.  Indeed, one would be hard-pressed 
to identify the “information” in much advertising.  But more importantly, can speech that 
is not true ever be considered “information”?
Truth
The most emphasized theoretical basis provided protection to freedom of speech 
is the notion that it is only through an open exchange of ideas that the truth is most likely 
to emerge.125  Virtually all the variations on the theoretical framework proposed by 
Emerson turn around this idea that truth, or at least that the individual’s “truth” as 
expressed through their choices representing the maximization of their utilities, will best 
122
 As David Vladeck notes the Supreme Court appears to have incorporated some notion of speaker’s 
rights into the commercial speech doctrine, despite the absence of this element in the earlier law, in two 
recent cases.  See Vladeck, Lessons From a Story Untold, supra note 42 at 1072-73 (citing Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) and Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 
(2002)).  While this is definitely a shift in the doctrine it appears to have been under-theorized one and 
there is no telling if it is deliberate or will be permanent. In neither case did the Court acknowledge 
explicitly that it was introducing a justification not found in the foundational cases.  Instead, the Court 
appeared to assume that it was self-evidently true that the doctrine protected this interest.  This is not 
surprising, given the metaphor of corporate personhood.  One of the goals of this article is to expose this 
shift as a departure from the original justifications for the doctrine and one with potentially far reaching 
consequences that it is not clear that the Court has fully considered, given that the shift was not remarked.
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 Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply To Professor 
Baker, 130 U.PA.L.REV. 678 (1982) (emphasis added).
124 See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussion of Merck’s calculation of the costs of 
disseminating information about the heart risks of Vioxx).
125 See, e.g., Debra J. LaFetra, Kick It Up A Notch: First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech, 54 
CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 1205 (2004).
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find expression or satisfaction through minimal restraint on the marketplace of ideas. 
This is certainly the claim most emphasized by Nike and its supporters during the course 
of that case.126  This is also the basis on which one of the most prominent proponents of 
freedom of commercial expression, Professor Martin Redish, has based his argument.127
“Information received in the commercial context...is specifically designed to assist the 
individual in the decision-making process,” he claims.128 One might quarrel with several 
characterizations in this sentence, but the principal one of concern here is “information.”  
As Redish himself noted in 1971, even “[a] cursory examination of current television and 
periodical advertising reveals that in practice, comparatively little commercial promotion 
performs a purely informational function.”129
It would seem that commercial advertising (which is what Redish was describing, 
not public relations or advocacy speech), is even less “informative” now, in 2005, than it 
was then, more than thirty years ago.  Nevertheless, Professor Redish’s arguments won 
out when some five years after the publication of his article arguing for some protection 
for advertising, the Supreme Court decided that the public did indeed have as much 
interest in hearing correct price information as it did hearing about the news of the day.130
It was on this basis, the consumer’s right to receive information, that the Court extended 
a limited protection to commercial speech.  But self-expression for the corporation
played no part in the justification for this extension.  The Court reserved to the 
government the right to regulate commercial speech for its truth.131
If the prospect of getting to the truth is the justification for extending protection 
for speech, it would seem that justification similarly offers a basis for the regulation of 
speech under conditions where the structural incentives are so clearly slanted toward 
communication that will persuade, regardless of whether it will “inform.”132  Marketing is 
the paradigmatic example of such a context.  Some marketing professionals openly claim 
that truth is irrelevant to sales.133  This is, of course, not an astonishing observation.  
126 See supra, notes 103 and 115.
127 See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace, 39 GEO.WASH.L.REV. 429 (1971).  In 
fact he also convincingly folds self-government into self-actualization claiming that Emerson’s third value 
is really just a manifestation of the first value.  Id. at 439.
128 Id. supra note 127 at 445.
129 Id. at 433.
130
 As the Court in Virginia Pharmacy noted, “[T]he particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of 
commercial information ...may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent 
political debate.” Virginia Pharmacy, supra note 30 at 763.
131
 “In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of course do not hold that it 
can never be regulated... Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own 
sake. ...The First Amendment, as we construe it today does not prohibit the State from insuring that the 
stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.” Virginia Pharmacy, supra note 30 at 
770-72 (internal citations omitted).  See also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of 
new York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (in order for commercial speech to be protected by the First 
Amendment the speech “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading”).
132 See, e.g., Sarah C. Haan, The “Persuasion Route” of the Law: Advertising and Legal Persuasion, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (2000).
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Rather it predictable and intuitive, if only because consumers have a limited amount of 
time and access to reliable information from which to assess marketing claims, quite 
apart from whether or not marketing operates on non-rational thought processes in the 
first place.  
If, as I explored more fully above, corporations have a duty to communicate in 
ways that will maximize shareholder value by generating profits and good publicity, then 
if they are permitted to communicate false information that will generate value and they 
can do so without legal consequences they will do so.134  In fact, as noted in the 
introduction, even with existing laws governing fraud and dealing with corporate 
statements it always possible that a corporation will decide that it is not cost effective to 
follow the law.  Consider the case of Phillip Morris.  On September 22, 1999 the United 
States brought a case against several tobacco companies and some of their public 
relations arms, alleging a conspiracy to commit fraud to endanger the lives of millions of 
Americans by concealing or misrepresenting the evidence of the negative health 
consequences of smoking. 135  The government alleged that “[i]n order to avoid discovery 
of their fraudulent conduct and the possibility that they might be called to account for 
their conduct, defendants engaged in a widespread scheme to frustrate public scrutiny by 
making false and deceptive statements and by concealing documents and research that 
they knew would have exposed their public campaign of deceit.”136 The motive?  “[T]he 
shared goals of maximizing profits.”137  The tobacco companies largely furthered this 
conspiracy by maintaining that the question of whether smoking had negative health 
questions was a matter of debate.  In 2005 the negative health consequences of smoking 
appear beyond “debate.”  But it appears from the case that the behavior of concealing 
evidence or violating the law did not end with the collapse of that “debate.”
Instead this pattern of “concealing” documents continued into the trial itself, for 
on July 21, 2004, Judge Kessler, the presiding judge, ordered Phillips Morris to pay a 
monetary discovery sanction of $2.75 million dollars for spoliation, or destruction, of the 
evidence.  The sanction was assessed because the judge found that Phillip Morris’ failure 
to comply with a court order requiring document retention reflected “reckless disregard 
and gross indifference [by Phillip Morris and its parent Altria Group] toward their 
discovery and document preservation obligation.”138  Defendants had destroyed, pursuant 
to their document destruction policy, some email records that an earlier court order 
required them to preserve.  Then when the destruction was discovered, defendants failed 
to notify the government and the court of that fact for several months.
CMO MAGAZINE (June 2005).  See also Lew McCreary, Lies, Damn Lies and Puffery, CMO Magazine 
(august 3, 2005) (http://www.cmomagazine.com/read/070105/lies_puffery.html). 
134
 Indeed the law currently permits some false statements if they can be characterized as “puffing” – that 
is, assertions so obviously inflated that no rational person would believe they were literally true.  See, e.g., 
Tamara R. Piety, Merchants of Discontent: An Exploration of the Psychology of Advertising, Addiction, 
and the Implications for Commercial  Speech, 25 SEATTLE L. REV. 377, 394-96 and accompanying 
footnotes (2001) (describing puffing doctrine).
135 See Amended Complaint, United States v. Phillip Morris, et. al., Case no. 99-C V-02496(GK) at 2-3.
136
 Amended Complaint at 3, ¶ 5.
137 Id.
138 See Order # 600, of July 21, 2004 at 7, available on line at http://wwwusdoj.gov/civ/cases/tobacco2/
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Why would a good corporate citizen, as Altria, the parent company for Phillip 
Morris, undoubtedly like to be viewed by the public,139 flout a court order? Could this be 
a rogue company?140  A hint might be found in the judge’s own opinion.  She noted that it 
was difficult to calculate a proportional sanction, as is required by the rules,141 “because 
we have no way of knowing what, if any value those destroyed emails had to Plaintiff’s 
case...”142  In other words, there was no way of knowing what value the evidence was to 
plaintiff.  But it was possible to look at what was at stake for the defendants.  The 
government had originally sought $280 billion in damages.  Although an appellate court 
rejected the claim for anything but forward-looking damages,143 the possibility still 
existed that liability would run into the billions, not the millions.  In that light, $ 2.75 
million would be a small price to pay if the evidence that was destroyed reduced the 
probabilities of a multi-billion dollar verdict.144
Apart from the ubiquitous profit motive, there is the additional problem that even 
when a corporation is found to have “lied,” it may be difficult to attribute that lie and the 
requisite intentionality to any person, thereby making a corporate criminal conviction 
virtually impossible. For example, the government succeeded in garnering a conviction 
against Arthur Andersen for its role in the Enron debacle.  But that conviction was later 
overturned by the United States Supreme Court’s conclusion that the jury instructions 
were too vague on the mens rea issue and therefore might permit a conviction without 
evidence of the requisite criminal intent.145  Of course establishing corporate intent is 
itself a somewhat metaphysical proposition since we can only find “intent” in its 
employees, but the dispersal of authority, knowledge and responsibility may mean that 
everyone can plausibly claim they didn’t know what they were doing was wrong so a 
criminal conviction of any individual may be elusive as well. 
139
 “The Altria family of companies is firmly committed to pursuing its business objectives with integrity 
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(description of commitments to various “stakeholders” beyond shareholders).
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In addition to the problems of financial incentives and metaphysical challenges 
when it comes to holding corporations liable for misstatements (thus giving little 
structural incentive to tell unpleasant truths), there are yet other roadblocks to the truth 
function – sometimes the regulatory authorities themselves support corporate reluctance 
to be more forthcoming.  For example, it is not much help for a particular regulatory 
effort if the head of that effort, be it an agency or a prosecution, views his or her job as 
being in “partnership” with business146 or, even worse, decides he or she is not in favor of 
a particular regulatory or disciplinary effort and thus wants to withdraw it.  This 
happened in the 70s with the head of the FTC.147.  And it has happened more recently 
when the Department of Justice submitted a request for “only” $ 10 billion in damages in 
the above mentioned tobacco prosecution, instead of the expected $130 billion or so 
indicating that it had not done so as a result of political pressure but leaving many 
observers skeptical about that statement.148  In the face of the evidence of such enormous 
influence in the political process, the argument that these entities, corporations, need 
additional advantages and protection beggars belief.
As if this were not enough, as the McLibel case in the U.K. and Fox Network’s 
lawsuit in the U.S. [against comedian Al Franken for the use of the words “fair and 
balanced”] illustrate,149 corporate interests often aggressively litigate against the speech 
of others that they find offensive.  This undoubtedly has, and is meant to have a chilling 
effect on anyone else who has a mind to criticize the companies in question.150
Moreover, advertisers often have enormous influence on media content and can withdraw 
their advertising dollars from media and from messages with which they disagree or 
which they find presents the “wrong” environment for their ads.151  Corporations have no 
interest in democracy per se.  They have an interest in supporting whatever legal regime 
guarantees the most congenial environment in which to generate profits.  Thus, 
corporations do not hesitate to re-incorporate in Liberia or the Bahamas or to move 
certain parts of their operations to other countries simply because they were initially 
incorporated in the United States.  Kasky alleged that Nike spent almost $1 billion in 
fiscal year 1997 on marketing,152 yet Nike argued to the Supreme Court that without 
146
 “The notion that business and government are and should be partners is ubiquitous, unremarkable, and 
repeated like a manta by leaders in both domains.” BAKAN, THE COPORATION, supra note 15 at 108.
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148 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Lawyers Fought U.S. Move to Curb Tobacco Penalty, THE NEW YORK TIMES
June 16, 2005.
149 See Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA), Inc., No. 03 Civ. 6162 (RLC), 2003 WL 
23281520 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2003) (denying temporary retraining order on humorist Al Franken’s use of 
the term “fair and balanced”).
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 In secret tapes made of the settlement negotiations in the McLibel case some unidentified representative 
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152 See Amended Complaint at 5.
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constitutional protection from liability for false speech it would be “silenced” and it 
would not be able to participate in the “debate” about globalization.153  A billion dollars 
is a lot of speech.  Given the economic imperatives discussed above, it is unlikely that 
Nike will be silenced by any penalties.  What this adds up to is the conclusion that it 
naive to think that in this environment more protection for commercial speech, that is, 
removing the flimsy existing constraints on it, is likely to lead to more truth, a better 
debate or any more information.
Participation in Democracy
A third justification offered for the protection for freedom of expression is that 
freedom of expression is a prerequisite to democracy.  A democracy isn’t really a 
democracy without the participation of its citizens.  Citizens require protection for their 
expression in order to fully participate.  However, although Nike characterized itself in 
the case before the Supreme Court as a “citizen” it is not.  Corporations are not citizens.  
And as such have (or rather ought to have) no role in the participation in democracy.154
This is not to say of course that their representatives can’t offer opinions.  But it is to say 
that corporations are not entitled to opinions.  Corporations do not vote.  Yet it is 
apparent to the meanest intelligence that of course corporations have a major, if not the 
dominant role in our democracy.  Corporations play key roles in urging legislation upon 
Congress and with a large measure of success, as the recent revisions to the bankruptcy 
code, urged by the credit card companies for their benefit illustrate.155  Corporations can 
offer legislators attractive trips to luxurious locales under the pretext of “education.”156
They can invest billions in non-profit organizations to act as fronts, such as alleged in the 
tobacco litigation with the Tobacco Research Institute.157  They can invest billions in 
putting together “astroturf” organizations to lobby legislators – that is, organizations that 
resemble grassroots organizations pulled together by citizens but which are really made 
up of persons paid by the industry in question to pose as “concerned citizens.”158  All of 
these represent influences on government.  They suggest that the average large 
corporation has far more “voice,” far more participation in our democracy than most real 
citizens do.  It is difficult to understand how requiring such communications be truthful, 
where the truth can be ascertained, will injure democracy. 
In addition, the opinions of corporations need not be respected as the collective 
voice of its shareholders.  “[O]pinions offered by corporations are not themselves the 
product of a democratic struggle to formulate a point of view in the face of conflicting or 
multiple values.”159  As noted above, corporations have one value–maximizing 
153 See supra notes 103and 115.
154 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 39 at 1178 -83 (Part III – A Corporation is Not A Citizen).
155 See supra note 33.
156
 On the issue of corporate lobbying see STAUBER AND RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE, supra note 32 and 
NELSON, SULTANS OF SLEAZE, supra note 32.
157
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158 See STAUBER AND RAMPTON, TOXIC SLUDGE, supra note 32 at 79 (describing astroturf lobbying 
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159
30
shareholder value.  Their participation in political issues is invariably centered on that 
value.
When a corporation lobbies, however, its goal is set by law and market: it lobbies 
on behalf of the principle of the fictional shareholder, to maximize the returns to 
an imaginary being with no interests other than its shares in the corporation. No 
internal debate, coalition building or political process sets the corporate goal; the 
views of the various human participants in the firm are largely irrelevant. Unlike 
the group of citizens, then, the corporation speaks in a unified voice on behalf of a 
single principle rather than an ever-recreated compromise.160
***
Fictional shareholders ... will sacrifice almost anything in the interest of higher 
profit...; in contrast, the citizens behind the fiction can be expected to have far 
more diverse and conflicted opinions on ...important political struggles.161
***
This picture of the corporation acting on behalf of a fictional shareholder leads to 
the conclusion that corporations are defined by the law and the market in a way 
that makes them inappropriate participants in political debate.162
The question raised by the problem of should corporations be treated as human 
beings, that is, have extended to them legal protection for their “speech,” is whether they 
will be extended advantages in addition to those they already enjoy.  Although the 
Supreme Court held in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti163 that a corporation had 
a right to participate in political debates in some fashion, it stepped back from this 
position in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce164 with a reminder that 
corporations are, after all, creatures of the state and recipients of special benefits and 
advantages from the state not enjoyed by natural persons. 
State law grants corporations special advantages--such as limited liability, 
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of 
assets--that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their resources in 
ways that maximize the return on their shareholders' investments. These state-
created advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the 
Nation's economy, but also permit them to use resources amassed in the economic 
marketplace to obtain an unfair advantage in the political marketplace.165
Also, as the Court in Austin noted, 
[T]he political advantage of corporations is unfair because "[t]he resources in the 
treasury of a business corporation ... are not an indication of popular support for 
the corporation's political ideas. They reflect instead the economically motivated 
160
 Greenwood, supra note 11 at 1054.
161 Id. at 1004
162 Id. at 1003.
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decisions of investors and customers. The availability of these resources may 
make a corporation a formidable political presence, even though the power of the 
corporation may be no reflection of the power of its ideas."166
Even the participation they enjoy at present is arguably too much.  It beggars belief that 
this justification for protection for speech offers much support to extending more
protections to corporations than they already have.
Balance
Finally Emerson suggested that protection for freedom of expression offered some 
play in the joints of democracy, some possibility for blowing off steam and thereby 
contributed to social stability.  But those persons he envisioned needing a place to vent 
were undoubtedly the poor and dispossessed, whom those in power must always fear 
should they get excessively disgruntled.  Corporations as non-human entities don’t, in the 
first place, have an emotional need to blow off steam.  But given their privileged position 
in the American economy and in the political realm, it is difficult to characterize 
corporations as a despised and powerless minority having a grudge they need to vent lest 
they upset the government.  To the contrary, given corporations’ privileged position, their 
request for more privilege under the guise of “balance” looks more like the petulant
demands of a spoiled child.  The environment in which discussion of alternative ways of 
life can take place is already severely imbalanced and compromised by the firm grip 
consumerism and corporate structuring of our wants and needs has in all of our lives –
whether in the first world or elsewhere.  Only the truly poor are really free of it since they 
don’t present a good market.  But then they too suffer the effects.  Interest in “balance” 
hardly seems to argue in favor of more protection for corporate speech.
In fact, we already live in an environment in which the need for balance goes in 
the other direction because pro-corporate speech appears “neutral. If anything, it is the 
anti-corporate position which has difficulty getting aired.  For example, in Sultans of 
Sleaze, author Joyce Nelson describes the efforts in 1988 of the British Columbia Council 
of Forest Industries to re-position their industries as “green.”
[The council mounted a massive and expensive campaign to convince the public 
of its ‘sound forest and stewardship and reforestation programs.’ The campaign 
included educational displays in shopping malls, huge posters at bus stops, ads 
inside buses, and colour supplements delivered to most households in the 
province. ... Bu the biggest irritant in the whole PR effort was the Council’s 
‘Forests Forever’ ads a $2 million pitch on billboards and TV and in print media 
in which the Council spokespeople say what a wonderful job they are doing in 
managing B.C. forests.167
The ads ran for over a year on CBC-TV despite protests by environmental groups; 
but when a counter-ad, “Mystical Forests’, detailing the actual practices of the 
166 Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., (MFCL) 479 U.S. 238, 258 ((1986)).  
167 NELSON, SULTANS OF SLEAZE, supra note 32 at 133.
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logging industry was proposed by environmentalists and presented for CBC 
approval, it was turned down as “too controversial.”168
Canadian journalist and social activist Kalle Lasn has had similar problems getting the 
broadcast media to air his organization, AdBusters’ ad for “Buy Nothing Day” or for 
advertising parodies, leading the Adbusters Media Foundation to initiate legal action that 
has (so far) apparently been unsuccessful.169
Similarly, Amtrack attempted to refuse artist Michael Ledron’s ad, which entailed 
a photo-commentary on Coors Brewing Company’s support for the Nicaraguan contras 
and other right wing causes by parodying the company’s ad campaign which proclaimed 
Coor’s to be the Right Beer, with the slogan, “Is it the Right’s Beer Now?”, on the 
grounds that Amtrak did not allow “political” advertising on the particular display in 
question.170  The characterization of Ledron’s ad as “political” implies Coor’s ad is 
not.171  Amtrak attempted to assert its status as a corporation to argue that Lebron could 
not claim a violation of his First Amendment rights in connection with its refusal of what 
it characterized as political speech.172 The Supreme Court rejected this argument as to 
Amtrak, holding that where the government retains complete control over the 
corporation, the corporate form may be disregarded and the corporation viewed as an arm 
of the government.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that a private media company would be 
free to reject any ad it found controversial without fear of a First Amendment claim. And 
since one of the things of greatest concern for the principal advertisers, the lifeblood of 
all media, is that all content in the media present the appropriate selling environment for 
their goods, it is easy to see why “[a] message in support of the status quo is typically 
considered to be ‘neutral,’ ‘objective’, and ‘non-controversial”, while a message that 
departs from the status quo position or criticizes it is considered to have a ‘point of view’ 
and ‘bias.’”173  That does not suggest that a “balance” is likely to emerge from the current 
environment given the distribution of resources and incentives.
But it seems a little silly to have to state what seems to be obvious – that the 
corporate form offers an unparalleled opportunity for the accumulation of wealth and 
168 Id.  Another example of this phenomenon is the characterization, in Brill’s Content, of Consumer’s 
Union as having a compromised neutrality because, for instance, it “accepted grant money from 
foundations with specific agendas – such as limiting the use of pesticides – and the magazine has then run 
stories supporting those foundations’ goals.”  Jennifer Greenstein, Testing Consumer Reports, BRILL’S
CONTENT, September 1999 at 72.  The author doesn’t appear to consider that advertisers and 
manufacturers also have a “point of view” that undermines the impartiality of the information imparted 
about advertised products.  One gets the impression that the desire to sell a product is seen as morally 
neutral.
169 See KALLE LASN, CULTURE JAM: THE UNCOOLING OF AMERICA™ (Eagle Brook, New York, N.Y. , 
1999) at 196-197 
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power while at the same time diffusing responsibility.  While corporate frustration may 
represent a threat to the government, that threat is unlikely to be diffused by offering 
corporations freedom from liability for their speech. Large corporations in this world are 
powerful.  So such regulations as have been passed by the United States and the EU, 
member and non-member countries and any other government in the world which limit 
corporate speech seem to be engaged in uphill sledding.  Why it is so difficult to see this 
and why, when Kreuzer Medien GmbH claimed that article 10 of the Human Rights 
charter granted protection for freedom of expression for its advertising, was that claim 
not rapidly dismissed?  It is hard to know, but it might be the power of the metaphor.  
Having once named the corporate form as a “person” it may have been difficult to turn 
back.  Metaphors like the legal “personhood” of corporations and “the marketplace of 
ideas” have demonstrated that they have enduring power174 and can apparently, even in 
the minds of the most intelligent observers, represent a more appealing starting point of 
analysis than one grounded in an analysis of observed characteristics and operation.  But 
in the case of corporate speech what has happened is that metaphor has taken over the 
doctrine and moved the Courts and observers away from the grounds on which limited 
protection was offered to commercial expression in the first place – protection of 
consumers’ autonomy rights to make their own decisions with all the truthful information 
– into a freestanding entitlement for corporations to be free of governmental regulation of 
their communications.  To the extent that this would shield untruthful communications it 
represents a perversion of the doctrine.
Part III - Dealing with the Persistent Objections 
Maybe it is the fault of the metaphor.175  But a persistent objection raised to the 
argument here is one of speaker discrimination and meaningful line drawing.  To the first 
objection it is enough to simply point out that if a corporation is not an appropriate 
“speaker” then there is no discrimination.  Furthermore, there is nothing inherently 
inappropriate under existing doctrine about differing standards depending upon the 
identity of the speaker.  For example, differing standards have been upheld with respect 
to attorneys176 than other commercial speakers or the public at large. But this, it might be 
174 See GEORGE LAKOFF AND MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1980); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive 
Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1988).
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argued, is inadequate because I distinguish between for-profit and not for profit 
corporations and the argument is made, “What about the NAACP, the NRA or other 
organization formed for political purposes but organized as a corporation?”  Furthermore, 
what prevents corporations such as Wal-Mart or Phillip-Morris from setting up non-
profits to do their speaking for them?  Finally, the argument is made that discriminating 
on the basis of marketing versus non-marketing content is inappropriate content 
regulation.  These are good questions but ultimately not persuasive obstacles to the 
argument offered here.177
A. Speaker discrimination and line-drawing
In the first place, the corporate entity is a legal creation, so one response to this 
objection is that corporations have the qualities and the rights given to them by law, no 
more no less.  And just as the law already distinguishes between for-profit and not-for 
profit, close and public corporations, with differing rules applicable depending upon the 
status of the corporation, so it is not immediately obvious why, if a not-for-profit is 
subject to different tax laws it could not be subject to different treatment for purposes of 
the first amendment.  Additionally, because of differing legal structures, there are very 
real differences in the incentive structures as between corporations and non-corporate 
business that make differing treatment as to status eminently sensible.  As discussed 
above, the way in which corporations operate offer a basis for distinguishing between 
them and human beings. As professor Elhauge noted with respect to regulating corporate 
conduct generally:
Compared to noncorporate businesses, the corporate structure creates two 
problems for this supplemental means [social and moral sanctions] of regulating 
conduct: (1) Shareholders are insulated from the exposure and knowledge that 
creates social and moral sanctions, and (2) shareholders have collective action 
problems that make it difficult for them to act on any social or moral impulses 
they do feel.  Managerial conduct that perfectly represented shareholders would 
thus tend to produce socially suboptimal conduct.178
If one were to judge by the tidal wave of “suboptimal” conduct that appears to be 
occurring lately, one might be justified in concluding that in general management has 
been rather successful in representing at least the fictional shareholder fairly perfectly.
The coverage of corporations under the first amendment is a matter of finding a 
theoretical fit between the purpose of the amendment and the “nature” of corporations.  
But corporations have no organic “nature.”179  They have the form they are given and 
affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere of economic and 
professional regulation.”).
177
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thus whether their nature fits the purpose depends on their legal construction.  All that is 
required is for them to be seen in that light rather than as organic creatures with some 
mysterious natural essence. “[R]eification is a device for making something that is in fact 
complex seem simple, and that can be dangerous.  In reality, only individuals enjoy 
benefits, or bear the burdens and responsibilities, of actions affecting other 
individuals.”180  While it is obviously over-simplified to add to that quote that “only 
individuals have opinions or speech rights,” given that non-profit organizations are often 
organized precisely for generating speech, the conclusion that all organizations should 
have speech rights doesn’t follow either.  The Framers noted the potential for large, for-
profit, organizations to accumulate the type of power that can threaten the stability of 
democracy.181  The late nineteenth century also saw the growth of massive trust 
arrangements that held such power over the markets and government that it culminated in 
the government reasserting control over business interests in the form of such trust-
busting devices as the Sherman Antitrust Act.182  Thus, “[i]t is [] sensible for a 
Constitution which defends individual free expression and associational freedom to 
recognize free expression rights for many organization entities but not for corporate 
capital.”183  For example, 
[in] a union vote, persons are equal. In a corporate vote, shares of capital are 
equal, but persons are unequal according to how much capital they respectively 
own. The corporate voice then, represents not a plurality and a unity of people or 
citizens, but a plurality and unity of capital.184
But this does not avoid the practical objection that the borders are nevertheless 
permeable.  And when it is difficult to sort out news from promotion or art from product 
placement, not every case may be so easy to resolve.  Some entities may represent real 
mixed purposes entities.  Corporations fund real grass roots and non-profits as well as 
astroturf organizations and front operations.  How are we to tell the difference?  If the 
local mom & pop grocery store want to protest government zoning regulations and add 
the prominence and power of its trade name in lieu of the perhaps less well known names 
of the individual owners, well isn’t that permissible and isn’t this proposal starting us 
down the slippery slope in which all sorts of valuable speech will be regulated away? 
This is an objection that goes to the heart of our more cherished illusions about 
the potential of law for establishing certainty.  The objection seems so persuasive when 
launched in the context of this question of protection for speech.  Yet when ones looks 
analogize to an organic character is a far cry from saying they have the same dignitary rights accorded 
human beings.
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more closely it is clear that almost all of the law is made up of such difficult line-drawing 
exercises185 and that in fact, the argument that we must protect the for-profit 
corporation’s speech because we cannot tell where to draw the law is an objection that 
doesn’t hold up to close scrutiny.  The law already makes exceptions as between 
corporations on the basis of size for purposes of compliance with laws like Sarbanes-
Oxley.  In September of 2005 the Securities and Exchange Commission extended a 
second extension of time for small business to comply with certain of the provisions of 
Sarbanes Oxley.186  “Small” is defined as companies with “a market capitalization of less 
than $75 million.”187  As with all line drawing exercises the question could be raised, 
“Why $75 million and not $65 million or $100 million?”  Drawing a bright-line rule 
always runs the risk of over and under-inclusiveness that some of the cases included in 
the scope of the rule’s application don’t actually raise the risk of the evils the rule is 
meant to address and that some of the cases meant to be controlled by the rule fall outside 
of its operation.  That is not however a reason not to draw a line.  It does not seem at all 
absurd to suggest that there may be material and significant differences between for-
profit and non-profit, between the corner grocery store and Time-Warner that make a 
difference for purposes of the First Amendment. 
So the issue here, properly understood, is whether there is more harm to be 
anticipated by drawing the line as I propose, to exclude for-profit corporations, or least 
large for-profit corporations, from any more speech rights than those announced in the 
Virginia Pharmacy case – that is, protection for truthful, non-misleading statements, than 
would be the harms flowing from the virtual absence of governmental regulation.  A 
parallel inquiry might be whether the benefits anticipated from the regulation exceed the 
costs or whether, conversely, the benefits of freedom of commercial expression outweigh 
any costs.  Given that there is no human 
To be sure, just as when the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan drew a line of 
“actual malice” for sustaining libel claims against public officials on matters of public 
concern, it was possible that some meritorious claims would be lost, some libels would 
go unpunished and perhaps some new, unanticipated evil would arise as a result which 
might require a reassessment of the standard in light of that evil, [although so far it has 
not], this proposal, to reject the notion of freedom for commercial expression may run 
into future difficulties.  But to refuse to act on the basis of a speculative harm or a 
speculative difficulty as to how to draw the line in some future cases not yet brought
seems wrong when the dangers and problems arising from the current system are so 
manifest.  It cannot be overemphasized that what is primarily at issue here is whether to 
hand over a constitutional shield to commercial interests for speech contrary to the public 
185 For example, how is one to tell “legitimate” discipline of an employee from retaliatory discipline for the 
employee’s whistle blowing activities?  Does the right to bear arms mean the right to bear nuclear arms?  
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interest. That corporate actions often are anti-democratic or in some conflict with 
democratic principles seems undeniable.188
B. Content Discrimination
Some observers argue that the suggestion that promotional speech is entitled to 
less First Amendment protection than political or expressive speech is inappropriate 
content discrimination.  To some extent the content discrimination objection is really an 
argument that the Court in Virginia Pharmacy should have recognized the speech at issue 
as completely protected, rather than setting up a secondary status for commercial speech.  
But couched in terms of content discrimination it elides the fact that prior to Virginia 
Pharmacy (and indeed to a large extent afterwards) this was acceptable content 
discrimination.  Promotional (or commercial) speech was simply not thought to be 
covered by the First Amendment at all in much the same way that restraints on speech 
imposed by an entity other than the government, for instance by an employer, were 
similarly not seen as triggering First Amendment scrutiny.  So if it is not covered, it 
seems difficult to say that by extending limited protection you are engaging in content 
discrimination. By its terms the amendment acts as a restraint on government.  Even 
within the framework of the restraint on government exceptions were made for certain 
types of speech, libel, obscenity, sedition, treason, etc.  Virginia Pharmacy had the effect 
of extending limited First Amendment protection to a previously uncovered content 
category – commercial speech.  So we must undertake the question of the permissibility 
of content discrimination from the standpoint that the existing law permits content 
discrimination in this area.  Commercial speech is defined by its content.  So the question 
is not whether we shall initiate content discrimination, but whether content discrimination 
of this type is rational and should be extended, modified or abolished. 
The Virginia Pharmacy Court began from the premise that commercial speech is 
less valuable to the values the First Amendment was intended to protect than other types 
of speech that were protected by the Amendment.  But it concluded that this did not mean 
that it was of no value.  Even though as was noted in other contexts, the Constitution does 
not require subscription to any particular economic theory, the Court found there was 
some social benefit to be derived from not unduly restricting speech in the commercial 
context.  The Court found some value, coupled with a keen public interest, in certain 
types of commercial speech – in truthful commercial speech.  This distinguishes this 
speech from expressive speech protected not because of its content or who the speaker is 
but because its existence furthers human freedom.  And commercial speech by 
corporations offered to further its interests in the marketplace is very different from that 
of an organization of persons, such as the ACLU, formed for the purpose of political 
participation.  
Just as is so often recited in other contexts, false speech has never been protected 
for its own sake.  The question is whether there is some countervailing reason to protect 
the false speech.  In the political context, as the Court in New York Times v. Sullivan
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noted, protection for even false statements in the political context allows for vigorous 
debate, the airing of all views, etc.  It furthers individual’s self-expression and protects 
the expression of dissident viewpoints.  But value does false commercial speech protect? 
Arguably none.  False commercial speech may give the speaker a commercial advantage, 
but it is not one that it is socially desirable to extend.  And when the speaker is a for-
profit corporation there is no expressive interest to be protected either.
Finally, although I my arguments here, taken at their strongest suggest abrogation 
of the commercial speech doctrine and of Bellotti and its progeny altogether, that is not 
this article’s principal target.  Rather, its principal aim is to generate agreement that, if 
nothing else, freedom for commercial expression should not be expanded beyond the 
current doctrine and that the current doctrine ought to be interpreted more capaciously to 
include all for-profit motivated, promotional speech that takes place under the umbrella 
of marketing.  Let it be left to the facts of the particular case whether some speech is 
primarily “marketing” or not.  Presumably, in the process of hearing such cases, facts 
heretofore not considered can be analyzed with an eye to whether or not they fit primarily 
in the marketing or primarily in the political speech category and the outlines of the 
doctrine further sketched out.  This is the way a common law system works.
Conclusion
Corporations (or large business interests) have greater and more subtle influences 
on our lives than the governments under which we live.  They influence what we think is 
attractive in a mate, what we think our weddings should look like, how we feel about 
ourselves given our looks and possessions.  They frame some of our most urgent desires 
and tell us what we ought to think is important. They may even have a role in 
manipulating war and peace and political candidacies. They accumulate massive amounts 
of wealth and wield substantial influence with governments in a way that few individuals 
or any political coalition would ever hope to do.  Their access to means of 
communicating their message affect our ability to understand the issues, frame them or 
make choices.  And the frames that they supply often affect our health, the environment, 
our peace of mind and the values of our children.  All of this and yet they want more.  
They want to use the metaphor of corporate personhood to shield them further from the 
costs of these activities.  That is an outrageous request.  Yet they have succeeded in 
framing the debate.  It is time to reframe it.
